Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/graphql-auditnpx skills add Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill graphql-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/graphql-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/graphql-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/graphql-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00092 | $0.04459 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.02230 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00892 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00446 |
Grade A, and why
graphql-audit scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -X POST https://target.com/graphql \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 524 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GRAPHQL SECURITY AUDIT
GraphQL flips the threat model — clients drive queries. One endpoint, infinite attack surface. Introspection hands you the schema; even without it, field suggestions give you 80% back.
0. QUICK KILL CHECKLIST
[ ] Run graphql_audit.sh <endpoint> — full automated sweep
[ ] Check if introspection is enabled (__schema query)
[ ] If introspection off — run clairvoyance for field discovery
[ ] Fingerprint engine (graphw00f) — different engines, different CVEs
[ ] Test query batching — send 100 identical queries in one POST
[ ] Test alias bombing — 1000 aliases in one query
[ ] Check field suggestions on typos — leaks schema even when introspection off
[ ] Try IDOR: query another user's object by ID, no auth check
[ ] Test field-level auth: query privileged fields (admin, role, internalNote)
[ ] Inject SQLi/NoSQLi via string arguments — id, filter, search args
[ ] Check subscriptions: can you subscribe to other users' events?
[ ] Try introspection bypass: __schema\nquery, query batching, fragment tricks
[ ] Look for mutation rate limiting — account takeover / self-XSS via mutations
1. TOOL — graphql_audit.sh
# Basic audit
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql
# With auth cookie
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/api/graphql --cookie "session=abc123"
# With Authorization header
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --header "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN"
# Through Burp proxy
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
# Custom output directory
bash tools/graphql_audit.sh https://target.com/graphql --output-dir ./findings/target/graphql
Output: findings/<target>/graphql/<timestamp>/
introspection.json— full schema dump (if enabled)fingerprint.txt— engine type (graphw00f)field_suggestions.txt— discovered fields via clairvoyancebatching_dos.txt— response time delta for 1 vs 100 queriesalias_bomb.txt— alias depth test resultsgqlmap.txt— injection scan resultscop_report.txt— graphql-cop attack checklist resultssummary.txt— hit/miss per phase
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 524 lines · 92 tokens per session scan A 1a5c554be934
graphql-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,689 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 92 tokens to every session and 4,459 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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