Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-teWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-te)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-te"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-te/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-te"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/http-request-smuggling-te-te.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00079 | $0.01697 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00848 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00339 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00170 |
Grade A, and why
http-request-smuggling-te-te scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
tools: [burp-suite, curl] This is a copy
100% identical to http-request-smuggling-te-te — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 171 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HTTP Request Smuggling (TE.TE)
When to Use
- When auditing modern web architectures that utilize a reverse proxy, load balancer, or CDN (Frontend) sitting in front of the actual application server (Backend).
- When standard CL.TE or TE.CL request smuggling vectors fail because both servers support the
Transfer-Encoding: chunkedheader. - To achieve critical impact such as bypassing front-end IP restrictions, web application firewalls (WAF), or executing devastating web cache poisoning attacks.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
- Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
- Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
- SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration
Workflow
Phase 1: Understanding TE.TE Smuggling (The Concept)
# Concept: Normally, HTTP requests are separated securely.
# In Request Smuggling, we send *one* mathematically ambiguous HTTP request that the Frontend
# proxy interprets as a single request, but the Backend interprets as *two* requests.
# TE.TE (Transfer-Encoding / Transfer-Encoding) occurs when BOTH the Frontend and Backend
# servers support the `Transfer-Encoding` header.
# The Attack: We send a request with TWO `Transfer-Encoding` headers, but we intentionally
# obfuscate one of them. The goal is to make the Frontend process the request using `chunked`
# encoding, but trick the Backend into ignoring it (falling back to `Content-Length`) or vice versa.
Phase 2: Obfuscating the Transfer-Encoding Header
# We must find an obfuscation technique that one server accepts but the other rejects.
# Method 1: Spacing
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding : x
# Method 2: Invalid encoding name
Transfer-Encoding: xchunked
# Method 3: Line folding (historical, but sometimes effective)
Transfer-Encoding:
chunked
# If the Frontend processes the first header (chunked) and the Backend processes the second (invalid/ignored),
# we effectively convert the attack into a standard TE.CL attack, achieving desynchronization.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 171 lines · 79 tokens per session scan A e2f0354361b8
http-request-smuggling-te-te is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 79 tokens to every session and 1,697 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to http-request-smuggling-te-te, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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