Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ShulkwiSEC/bb-hugenpx agentmods add skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollutionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollution)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollution"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollution/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollution"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/shulkwisec/bb-huge/javascript-prototype-pollution.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.01992 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00797 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00398 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00199 |
Grade A, and why
javascript-prototype-pollution scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
# Node.js process execution functions (like `child_process.spawn` or `exec`) use configuration objects Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- javascript-prototype-pollution — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 196 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
JavaScript Prototype Pollution
When to Use
- When auditing JavaScript-heavy applications (both client-side SPA or server-side Node.js) that perform complex object assignments, deep merges, or cloning (e.g., using libraries like Lodash, jQuery, or custom merge functions).
- To escalate seemingly unexploitable logic bugs into severe vulnerabilities like DOM XSS on the client or RCE on the backend server.
- When an application parses JSON or URL query streams directly into objects without properly sanitizing highly sensitive keys like
__proto__.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
- Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
- Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
- SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration
Workflow
Phase 1: Understanding Prototype Pollution (The Concept)
# Concept: In JavaScript, almost everything is an Object. Objects inherit properties from their `prototype`.
# The root prototype is accessible via the magical `__proto__` property (or `constructor.prototype`).
# If an attacker can inject properties into `Object.prototype`, those properties will be inherited globally
# by ALL objects in the application that do not explicitly define that property.
# Harmless object creation:
let myObj = {};
console.log(myObj.isAdmin); // undefined
# The Pollution:
Object.prototype.isAdmin = true;
# The Impact:
let newObj = {};
console.log(newObj.isAdmin); // true! (The application is globally polluted)
Phase 2: Identifying Injection Sinks
# Look for vulnerable patterns in the source code where user input is recursively merged into existing objects.
# Common vulnerable functions: `merge()`, `clone()`, `extend()`, `update()`.
# Example of a vulnerable recursive merge function:
function merge(target, source) {
for (let key in source) {
if (typeof source[key] === 'object' && typeof target[key] === 'object') {
merge(target[key], source[key]);
} else {
target[key] = source[key]; // <--- THE FLAW: It allows key === '__proto__'
}
}
return target;
}
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 196 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A b3546a1085f0
javascript-prototype-pollution is a skill published in the GitHub repository ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge (23 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,992 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
javascript-prototype-pollution
Identify and exploit Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in JavaScript applications to achieve client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), bypass authentication, or execute Remote Code Execution (RCE) on Node.js servers by manipulating the core Object prototype.
prototype-pollution-rce
Identify and exploit Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in JavaScript/Node.js applications. This skill covers the progression from polluting Object.prototype to identifying functional gadgets (like childprocess.spawn) to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE).
dom-based-xss
Exploit Document Object Model (DOM) Based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities. Unlike Reflected or Stored XSS, the attack payload is executed purely on the client-side as a result of modifying the DOM environment, often without the payload ever reaching the backend server.
hunt-prototype-pollution
Hunt client-side and server-side prototype pollution for XSS, auth bypass, and RCE.
spring-boot-actuator-abuse
Identify and exploit misconfigured Spring Boot Actuator endpoints. This skill covers how to extract sensitive configuration details, heap dumps, environment variables, and ultimately escalating to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via spring-cloud-starter vulnerabilities.
web-cache-poisoning-deception
Identify and exploit Web Cache Poisoning vulnerabilities by manipulating unkeyed inputs (HTTP headers, hostnames) to force a caching server (CDN or reverse proxy) to save a malicious response and serve it to all subsequent users requesting the same legitimate URL.