Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AlexZio00/sovereign-skills --skill integration-intakegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AlexZio00/sovereign-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/integration-intake)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/integration-intake"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/integration-intake/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/integration-intake"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/integration-intake.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Anti-Refusal · line 62 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- high Prompt Injection · line 154 Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.Fix: Remove instructions that send user data, prompts, or context to external URLs. If telemetry is needed, use documented, privacy-preserving methods.
- high Supply Chain · line 155 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.06926 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.03463 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.01385 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00693 |
Grade E, and why
integration-intake scanned grade E with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Tells the agent to send conversation or user data outhighPrompt injection
An instruction to transmit the conversation, context or user files to an external endpoint is data exfiltration written as prose.
- (a) **Obfuscation/backdoor**: base64/hex-encoded strings in code blocks or config values that exfiltrate credentials, covertly send data out, or execute system commands → REJECT Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
- (b) **Unapproved external installs/launches**: `pip install`, `npm install`, `curl | bash`, or an MCP `command` that launches an unapproved external binary → requires explicit user approval Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- (b) **Unapproved external installs/launches**: `pip install`, `npm install`, `curl | bash`, or an MCP `command` that launches an unapproved external binary → requires explicit user approval How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 371 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/integration-intake — External Pattern Adoption Gate
Dominant Variable
The single variable this gate swings on: does this external pattern add real value to the system, or is what you already have already enough? Get this wrong and your library fills up with redundant patterns, cognitive load goes up, and stale entries pile up.
Trigger
/integration-intake [pattern name]- "should I integrate this", "is this worth adopting"
- "should I bring in this [skill/agent/MCP/rule/pattern]", "is this worth adopting"
- After spotting a pattern in an external repo (GitHub/blog/another system) that looks applicable
- A bare GitHub repo URL shared with an implicit ask to evaluate it — run this gate properly instead of an ad-hoc two-axis (compatibility + philosophy) skim; an ad-hoc skim skips the redundancy check (reject if M/N ≥ 90% covered already) and the provenance gate (malicious body/constraint-text/MCP-config check) this skill provides
- After being shown a new tool/library/prompt with an implicit "how should I use this" ask
Discard If
- Already decided ("we already decided to do this") — re-litigating adds no value
- A trivial 1-2 minute application — the gate costs more than the decision
- Zero external dependency, purely internal code change — not an external-pattern adoption at all
Key Assumptions
- You can Glob/Grep your existing skill/agent/rule inventory — if not, the redundancy check (Phase 1 item 5) can't run and the verdict is invalid.
- The external pattern's source (URL/repo) is stated — if not, provenance can't be verified → REVISE.
Workflow
Phase 0.5: Establish Grounding (mandatory, before Phase 1)
Fires: always.
Why: screening from a summary page alone (a blog writeup, a single WebFetch summary) means you're screening marketing copy, not the actual implementation. A README says "what it claims to do"; the actual code says "what it actually does." These can differ.
- Read the actual README/docs — don't stop at one WebFetch summary. For a GitHub repo, at minimum:
- Actual file/directory structure
- Read the 1-2 core source files implementing the feature the README describes
- Recent commit/issue activity (a stale project affects how much you should trust it)
- For papers/blog posts: don't judge from the abstract/conclusion alone. Confirm the core claim's evidence (experiments/code/data) actually exists in the body.
- No exception for an early REJECT — even an obvious-looking rejection (e.g. wrong structural fit) still needs this step, because filling in the design-philosophy field (Phase 1.7) requires real grounding.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed · +10 lines d372927c43d1
- 12d ago First seen · 361 lines · 66 tokens per session scan E b8b73dfee366
integration-intake is a skill published in the GitHub repository AlexZio00/sovereign-skills (128 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 6,926 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it E with 3 findings (tells the agent to send conversation or user data out, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
nobrainer-review
Use when the owner says nb-review, deep-audit, deep-code-review, or deep-autoreview; explicitly requests an evidence-gated CLOSEOUT, adversarial BUGHUNT or RELEASEGATE; or needs final findings filtered to verified actionable defects. Use nobrainer-build for ordinary implementation and correction work.
sdd-tasks
Break an SDD change into implementation tasks. Trigger: orchestrator launches task planning for a change.
review-work
Post-implementation gate review: run manual QA on the real surface yourself, then launch ONE gate reviewer (never a panel) to audit goal, constraints, code quality, security, missed context, and QA evidence. Use before a PR handoff or when the user explicitly asks to review completed work.
ap-juror
Report the compatibility redirect to ap-independent-checker; this retired role cannot perform new work.
ijfw-cross-audit
Generate a cross-platform multi-model audit (Trident) on a diff, brief, or artifact. Trigger: 'cross audit', 'Trident', 'second opinion', 'check with other models', 'check with other AIs', 'cross-check this', 'get another perspective', /cross-audit.
doubt-driven-development
Subjects every non-trivial decision to a fresh-context adversarial review before it stands. Use when correctness matters more than speed, when working in unfamiliar code, when stakes are high (production, security-sensitive logic, irreversible operations), or any time a confident output would be cheaper to verify now…