Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add AlexZio00/sovereign-skills --skill session-startgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AlexZio00/sovereign-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/session-start)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/session-start"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/session-start/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/session-start"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alexzio00/sovereign-skills/session-start.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 22 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 79 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 23 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Agent Snooping · line 90 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 97 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high Prompt Injection · line 105 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Agent Snooping · line 167 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Prompt Injection · line 262 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Agent Snooping · line 356 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- medium Excessive Agency · line 302 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 394 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 355 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00052 | $0.05581 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.02790 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.01116 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00558 |
Grade B, and why
session-start scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reads agent configuration directoriesmediumAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
3. `grep "^last-analysis:" ~/.claude/memory/model-diff-ledger.md` → `baseline_date` (if the header or file is absent, fall back to the earliest `seen:`/`date:` value found in the two counts above) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 404 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Session Start
Dominant Variable
Does the handoff document what to do next, or what was done? If it lists completed work, the handoff was written incorrectly. If Priority 1 cannot be identified immediately, deepen your inspection of Phase 1.
Trigger
/session-start- "start session"
- "continue from where"
- "where did we get"
- (Korean language triggers handled in YAML frontmatter above)
Discard If
memory/session-handoff-LATEST.mdmissing (first session) → skip, start fresh- User requests "start fresh" / "ignore context" → skip
- Project-unrelated standalone question → skip
Phase 0.5 runs even on discard: configuration errors must be detected in first session and standalone questions too.
Key Assumptions
- memory/session-handoff-LATEST.md exists — if broken: fallback to "new session" mode. Do not synthesize handoff.
- tasks/lessons.md exists — if broken: skip lesson review Phase.
- settings.json parseable — if broken: skip health-check Phase only; proceed normally with rest.
- scripts/harness_observability.py runs under the available Python interpreter — if broken: Phase 2.2/2.4 fall back to their own
tool_failurehandling (see those sections) rather than blocking session start.
Phase 0.5: Environment Health Check
Warnings only — no blocking. Use Read tool only (no modifications).
Check 1 — Model ID (read ~/.claude/settings.json):
- Confirm
"model"field value → warn if outside this list:["opus", "sonnet", "haiku", "fable", "claude-sonnet-5", "claude-opus-4-8", "claude-opus-4-7", "claude-sonnet-4-6", "claude-haiku-4-5", "claude-opus-4-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-fable-5"] # Context suffixes like [1m]/[200k] are stripped before comparison (e.g., claude-fable-5[1m] → claude-fable-5) - Message:
⚠️ settings.json model ID invalid: "{value}" — please update - If file missing: skip silently
Check 2 — Accumulated Allow Entries (read ~/.claude/settings.local.json):
- Count
permissions.allowarray items - If count > 5 →
⚠️ settings.local.json allow: N entries - If file missing: skip silently
What ships with it
5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +51 lines 19bc59a75005
- 11d ago First seen · 353 lines · 52 tokens per session scan B c45c2dbcaf20
session-start is a skill published in the GitHub repository AlexZio00/sovereign-skills (128 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 5,581 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (reads agent configuration directories). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
issue-creation
Trigger: issue creation, bug reports, feature requests, or issue approval. Create and triage GitHub issues from repository evidence.
sdd-tasks
Break an SDD change into implementation tasks. Trigger: orchestrator launches task planning for a change.
systemic-issue-triage
Trigger: new issue, bug report, triage, backlog, issue flood, community report, root cause, dead-end, blocked user. Attack issues by root class, never one-by-one; fixes must shrink the system, not grow it.
github-triage
Read-only GitHub triage for issues AND PRs. 1 item = 1 background task (category: quick). Analyzes all open items and writes evidence-backed reports to /tmp/{datetime}/. Every claim requires a GitHub permalink as proof. NEVER takes any action on GitHub - no comments, no merges, no closes, no labels. Reports only.…
finn-review
Review open PRs against their linked Linear issues and required GitHub checks, then post a three-group verdict with Finn-loop labels. Use when asked to run Finn-loop's reviewer or review its PR queue. Designed for /loop; never merges or pushes code.
jira
Unified Jira entry point. Routes to preview (default), create, or review subcommands.