install-claude-code-linux

install-claude-code-linux is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from alibaba/anolisa. It costs 81 tokens per session (1,451 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

Instructions for installing and configuring Claude Code, a command-line coding assistant, on RPM-based Linux systems such as Alibaba Cloud Linux.

In plain words
What is it for?
Checking system requirements, installing Claude Code, verifying it, and configuring an API provider on compatible Linux machines.
Why use it?
They provide an ordered installation checklist and fallback methods when the preferred installer does not work.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex ✓ vendor

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: reads .claude/ paths; mentions Claude Code.

Good fit Checking system requirements, installing Claude Code, verifying it, and configuring an API provider on compatible Linux machines.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code
About the project

ANOLISA is a server-side operating layer for AI agent workloads that provides terminal access, token-saving tool-output compression, runtime controls, security, observability, skills, memory, and sandbox management. It is for running and supervising agents from a Linux terminal while retaining an existing shell, agent framework, and sandbox. The catalogue add-ons are components of its agent operating environment and workflows.

alibaba/anolisa · 603 stars · on GitHub · agentic-os.sh

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add alibaba/anolisa --skill install-claude-code
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alibaba/anolisa

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for install-claude-code-linux

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for install-claude-code-linux

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alibaba/anolisa/install-claude-code.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 81 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,451 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. ✓ AI security review Sonnet 5 · 6 Sept 2026 📄 Read the review Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 21 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Supply Chain · line 42
    Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
    Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 52
    Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
    Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 105
    Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
    Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
  • high Supply Chain · line 60
    Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
    Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
  • high Supply Chain · line 66
    Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
    Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
  • high YARA Match · line 72
    YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
    Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
  • high Agent Snooping · line 128
    Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
  • high Agent Snooping · line 136
    Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
  • high Tool Misuse · line 194
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 195
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 205
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 195
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 205
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 206
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 42
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 90
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 93
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 131
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 187
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 188
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00081 $0.01451
Opus 5.5 $0.00032 $0.00580
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00016 $0.00290
Haiku 4.5 $0.00008 $0.00145

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 0cd19ca42b53, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

install-claude-code-linux scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

The scan reads SKILL.md. This mod also ships 1 executable file (scripts/install-claude-code.sh), listed below but not scanned — reading those needs a real analyzer, not pattern matching.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

src/os-skills/ai/install-claude-code/SKILL.md · 208 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 208 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Install Claude Code on Alinux 4

System Requirements

  • OS: Linux
  • RAM: 4 GB+
  • Network: 需要联网
  • Shell: Bash
  • Package Manager: dnf

Installation Workflow

Copy this checklist and track progress:

Task Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Check system & install prerequisites
- [ ] Step 2: Install Claude Code (try methods in order)
- [ ] Step 3: Verify installation
- [ ] Step 4: Configure API provider
- [ ] Step 5: Test run
- [ ] Step 6: Tokenless plugin auto-installed

Step 1: Check System & Install Prerequisites

Alinux 4 使用 dnf 作为包管理器。先确保基础依赖就绪:

# 确认系统版本
cat /etc/os-release

# 安装基础依赖
sudo dnf install -y curl git tar gzip glibc libstdc++

Step 2: Install Claude Code

Try these methods in order. Move to the next only if the previous one fails.

Method A: Native Installer (Recommended)

curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash

官方推荐方式,自动后台更新,无需 Node.js 依赖。

To install a specific version:

curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s 1.0.58

To install the stable channel:

curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s stable

安装后确保 ~/.local/bin 在 PATH 中:

echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc

Method B: npm Global Install (Fallback)

Requires Node.js 18+. Alinux 4 默认源的 Node.js 版本可能较低,建议先确认版本:

node --version

如果 >= 18,直接安装:

npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code

Do NOT use sudo npm install -g — it causes permission issues. If you get EACCES errors, fix npm prefix:

mkdir -p ~/.npm-global
npm config set prefix '~/.npm-global'
echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.npm-global/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code

Method C: nvm + npm (When No Node.js 18+ Available)

Alinux 4 默认源可能只有 Node.js 16,此方法通过 nvm 安装 LTS 版本:

curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.3/install.sh | bash
source ~/.bashrc
nvm install --lts
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code

Read the full file on GitHub · 208 lines

Files

What ships with it

1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 208 lines · 81 tokens per session scan F 0cd19ca42b53

Subscribe to this mod's changes

install-claude-code-linux is a skill published in the GitHub repository alibaba/anolisa (603 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 81 tokens to every session and 1,451 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

apps

Build and iterate on schema-backed Swarm Apps with live models, named queries, custom actions, and json-render interfaces using the app-upsert, app-get, app-list, and app-patch tools.

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 43 tokens

kapso-whatsapp

How to interact with Kapso WhatsApp from the swarm — read inbound webhook payloads (text AND media), fetch message history, send free-form messages within the 24h session window (and template messages outside it), mark-as-read, show the typing indicator, send reactions, download media, verify webhook signatures, and…

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 156 tokens

swarm-scripts

Bulk, repeat, fan-out, or data-heavy work: write and run swarm scripts (inline script-run, named script-upsert, durable launch-script-run). Covers the script-vs-tool rubric, the authoring contract (args first, ctx second), the seed catalog, connections and secrets, dbquery, and exposing a script as an API.

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 82 tokens

composio

Use Composio from Agent Swarm through the agent-swarm x composio CLI route, the swarmx MCP tool, or a registered ctx.api.composio script connection. Trigger when a task needs connected third-party app tools such as Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Docs, Google Drive, GitHub, Slack, Notion, or HubSpot through Tool Router…

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 128 tokens

motion-design-video-analysis

Reverse-engineer a short motion-design / product-update video (animation technique, timing and easing, composition, transitions, likely tooling, vibe, audio) and produce a rebuild spec someone can build from. Default path is one call to google/gemini-3.8-flash over sampled frames, then a mandatory by-eye check of…

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 107 tokens

open-prompt-showreel

Make a design-led motion-graphics video (showreel, eval comparison, feature or bug-hunt story) from one open prompt. Claude Opus at max effort designs, codes and renders the whole thing itself in a scratch dir, with no template and no repo PR. Use for any "make a video for X" / "do a showreel for Y" / "a little…

desplega-ai/agent-swarm · 181 tokens