Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add alsk1992/CloddsBot --skill permissionsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alsk1992/CloddsBotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 74 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 76 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 239 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 177 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 237 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 177 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 237 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 75 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 238 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 76 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 239 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00011 | $0.01315 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00658 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00263 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00131 |
Grade B, and why
permissions scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
'sudo *', Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
/permissions block "rm -rf" Block dangerous command Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 270 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Permissions - Complete API Reference
Manage command execution approvals, tool access policies, and security controls.
Chat Commands
View Permissions
/permissions View current permissions
/permissions list List all rules
/permissions pending View pending approvals
/permissions history View approval history
Approve/Reject
/approve Approve pending command
/approve <id> Approve specific request
/reject Reject pending command
/reject <id> "reason" Reject with reason
Allow/Block Rules
/permissions allow "npm install" Allow pattern
/permissions allow "git *" Allow with wildcard
/permissions block "rm -rf" Block dangerous command
/permissions remove <rule-id> Remove rule
Security Mode
/permissions mode Check current mode
/permissions mode allowlist Only allowed commands
/permissions mode blocklist Block specific commands
/permissions mode full Allow all (dangerous)
TypeScript API Reference
Create Permissions Manager
import { createPermissionsManager } from 'clodds/permissions';
const perms = createPermissionsManager({
// Security mode
mode: 'allowlist', // 'deny' | 'allowlist' | 'blocklist' | 'full'
// Default rules
defaultAllow: [
'ls *',
'cat *',
'git status',
'git diff',
'npm run *',
],
defaultBlock: [
'rm -rf *',
'sudo *',
'chmod 777 *',
],
// Approval settings
requireApproval: true,
approvalTimeoutMs: 60000,
// Storage
storage: 'sqlite',
dbPath: './permissions.db',
});
Check Permission
// Check if command is allowed
const result = await perms.check({
command: 'npm install lodash',
userId: 'user-123',
context: 'Installing dependency',
});
if (result.allowed) {
console.log('Command allowed');
} else if (result.needsApproval) {
console.log(`Waiting for approval: ${result.requestId}`);
} else {
console.log(`Blocked: ${result.reason}`);
}
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 270 lines · 11 tokens per session scan B 05429f879914
permissions is a skill published in the GitHub repository alsk1992/CloddsBot (1,190 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 1,315 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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