Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add aminueza/terraform-provider-minio --skill terraform-miniogit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aminueza/terraform-provider-minioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aminueza/terraform-provider-minio/terraform-minio)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aminueza/terraform-provider-minio/terraform-minio"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aminueza/terraform-provider-minio/terraform-minio/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aminueza/terraform-provider-minio/terraform-minio"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aminueza/terraform-provider-minio/terraform-minio.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 50 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 100 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00224 | $0.03864 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00090 | $0.01546 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00045 | $0.00773 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00386 |
Grade A, and why
terraform-minio scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 24d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
The source is not reproduced here
Licensed AGPL-3.0
The repository is licensed AGPL-3.0, which this catalogue does not treat as permission to reproduce the file. Read it at the source.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 24d ago Changed · +1 lines 7990b3354585
- 2mo ago First seen · 276 lines · 224 tokens per session scan A cbf1e3fbecf5
terraform-minio is a skill published in the GitHub repository aminueza/terraform-provider-minio (345 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed AGPL-3.0. It adds 224 tokens to every session and 3,864 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
terraform-minio compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| terraform-minioaminueza/terraform-provider-minio | Skill | 345 | yesterday | AGPL-3.0 | A | 224 | Claude Code, Codex |
| minio-aiopsAIops-tools/MinIO-AIops | Skill | 0 | 8d ago | MIT | A | 332 | Claude Code |
| files-sdkhaydenbleasel/files-sdk | Skill | 1.6k | 5d ago | MIT | A | 306 | Claude Code, Codex |
| performing-cloud-log-forensics-with-athenaxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 80 | Claude Code, Codex |
| auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissionsxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 62 | Claude Code, Codex |
| detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attemptsxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 63 | Claude Code, Codex |
| aws-essentialsericrisco/rsc-harness | Skill | 503 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 89 | Claude Code, Codex |