Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude --skill ag-rebobinargit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude/ag-rebobinar)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude/ag-rebobinar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude/ag-rebobinar/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude/ag-rebobinar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude/ag-rebobinar.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 80 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 119 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 4 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.01099 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00549 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00220 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00110 |
Grade A, and why
ag-rebobinar scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 133 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ag-rebobinar — Rewind / Undo Estruturado
Spawn the ag-rebobinar agent for structured undo of Claude actions with detailed logging.
Modos
| Modo | O que faz |
|---|---|
--last N |
Reverte as ultimas N mudancas (commits/edits) |
--file path |
Reverte um arquivo especifico ao estado anterior |
--commit SHA |
Reverte um commit especifico (git revert) |
--preview |
Dry-run — mostra o que SERIA revertido sem executar |
--since TIME |
Reverte tudo desde um timestamp (ex: "1 hour ago") |
Invocation
Use the Agent tool with:
subagent_type:general-purposemodel:sonnetmode:autorun_in_background:false(usuario precisa aprovar reverts)prompt: Compose from template below + $ARGUMENTS
Prompt Template
Projeto: [CWD]
Modo: [--last N | --file path | --commit SHA | --preview | --since TIME]
Voce e o agente de rewind. Reverte acoes com seguranca e rastreabilidade.
## Procedimento
### 1. Inventario (SEMPRE primeiro)
Antes de reverter qualquer coisa, catalogar o estado atual:
```bash
# Mudancas nao commitadas
git status --short
# Ultimos commits recentes
git log --oneline -20
# Stashes existentes
git stash list
# Diff do working tree
git diff --stat
2. Classificar mudancas
Para cada mudanca encontrada, classificar:
- Uncommitted edits: mudancas no working tree (git diff)
- Staged changes: mudancas no index (git diff --cached)
- Recent commits: commits feitos nesta sessao
- Stashed changes: git stash list
3. Preview (OBRIGATORIO antes de executar)
Mostrar ao usuario EXATAMENTE o que sera revertido:
## Rewind Preview
### Sera revertido:
1. [commit abc1234] feat: add login — 3 arquivos, +45 -12 linhas
2. [uncommitted] src/auth.ts — 8 linhas modificadas
3. [staged] src/types.ts — 2 linhas adicionadas
### NAO sera afetado:
- [commit def5678] fix: typo — anterior ao range solicitado
- node_modules/, .env — ignorados
### Acao: git revert abc1234 && git checkout -- src/auth.ts src/types.ts
4. Executar (apos aprovacao do usuario)
Para uncommitted changes:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 133 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A e7030668e6ec
ag-rebobinar is a skill published in the GitHub repository andregusman-raiz/a-gusman-claude (19 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 1,099 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
security-pipeline
Use when security verification is needed - pre-commit security checks, vulnerability scanning, STRIDE threat analysis. Integrates with /handoff-verify --security and /commit-push-pr. CWE Top 25 based.
github-commenting
How to post clean, rich, deduplicated GitHub PR review comments — suggestion blocks, multi-line anchors, markers, formatting rules. Load before posting or fixing any PR comment.
git-pushing
Stage, commit, and push git changes with conventional commit messages. Use when user wants to commit and push changes, mentions pushing to remote, or asks to save and push their work. Also activates when user says "push changes", "commit and push", "push this", "push to github", or similar git workflow requests.
commit-msg
You receive a git diff of staged changes via stdin. Generate a commit message.
ship
Ship workflow: detect + merge base branch, run tests, review diff, bump VERSION, update CHANGELOG, commit, push, create PR. Use when asked to "ship", "deploy", "push to main", "create a PR", "merge and push", or "get it deployed". Proactively invoke this skill (do NOT push/PR directly) when the user says code is…
commit
Commit the current work with a message that follows the repo's convention, closing the branch's issue when its name carries a number. Use when the user asks to commit, to record the work, or to save a change to history.