Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add andycungkrinx91/konoha --skill abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privescgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andycungkrinx91/konohaWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.01678 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00671 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00336 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00168 |
Grade A, and why
abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing and Remediating Shadow Credentials in Active Directory
Security Advisory: This guide provides defense and audit procedures for identifying, monitoring, and remediating overly permissive write access to
msDS-KeyCredentialLink(Shadow Credentials) in Active Directory environments.
Overview
The Shadow Credentials attack vector stems from misconfigured Active Directory Access Control Lists (ACLs) where non-administrative principals possess write permissions over the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of user or computer accounts. This attribute normally stores raw public keys ("Key Credentials") used by Windows Hello for Business and Microsoft Entra ID device registration for passwordless PKINIT Kerberos authentication.
When access permissions are too permissive — such as unconstrained GenericWrite, GenericAll, WriteProperty, or AddKeyCredentialLink Access Control Entries (ACEs) — an unauthorized principal could append a key credential to an account, bypass password controls, and obtain Kerberos tickets.
Defending against this vulnerability requires establishing strict access-controls, enabling granular directory service auditing, and maintaining proactive credential-management hygiene across all directory objects.
When to Use
- When auditing Active Directory Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) for excessive write privileges.
- When configuring Windows Security Event logging and SIEM correlation rules for directory modifications.
- When performing identity security posture assessments and tiering model reviews.
- When cleaning up legacy or unauthorized key credentials from Active Directory objects.
- When establishing least-privilege controls for hybrid identity and device registration service accounts.
Prerequisites
- Read access to Active Directory objects via LDAP / LDAPS (ports 389 / 636).
- Domain administrator or delegated audit privileges to inspect and remediate DACLs.
- Domain Controllers running Windows Server 2016 or later with Advanced Audit Policy configured.
- Audit tooling installed in a secure administrative workstation:
# Python ldap3 or pyWhisker for attribute enumeration python3 -m pip install ldap3 # Certipy for certificate template and key credential auditing pipx install certipy-ad
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 148 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A 08a33eeccfa4
abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc is a skill published in the GitHub repository andycungkrinx91/konoha (12 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 1,678 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-25.
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