Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andycungkrinx91/konohanpx agentmods add skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andycungkrinx91/konoha/auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.02920 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00023 | $0.01168 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00584 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00292 |
Grade B, and why
auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
command: ["/bin/sh","-c","cat /host/etc/shadow; sleep 1d"] Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -L https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/rbac-police/releases/latest/download/rbac-police-linux-amd64 -o rbac-police Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 262 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auditing Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Enumerating and exercising RBAC permissions affects a live cluster's access posture. Only test clusters you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to assess.
Overview
Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC, MITRE ATT&CK T1078 Valid Accounts) governs what every user and service account may do via Role/ClusterRole rules bound by RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding. Because workloads run with a mounted service-account token by default, an attacker who compromises one pod inherits that account's RBAC rights. Over-permissive bindings turn a single compromised pod into a cluster takeover: certain verbs and resources are "RBAC-equivalent to cluster-admin."
Per the Kubernetes "RBAC Good Practices" guidance and Unit 42 research, the dangerous primitives are:
escalateon roles — grant yourself any permission, even ones you do not hold.bindon clusterroles — create a binding tocluster-admin.impersonateon users/groups/serviceaccounts — act as any subject includingsystem:masters.create/update/patchonpods— schedule a privileged pod or mount the node, escaping to the host (T1611).createonpods/exec,pods/attach,pods/ephemeralcontainers— run code in any existing pod.get/list/watchonsecrets— list returns full secret contents, including other service-account tokens.createonserviceaccounts/token— mint tokens for more privileged accounts.update/patchonvalidatingwebhookconfigurations/mutatingwebhookconfigurations,nodes/proxy,certificatesigningrequests/approval— admission/CSR abuse to cluster-admin.- Wildcards (
verbs: ["*"],resources: ["*"]) — implicit super-privilege.
This skill systematically enumerates effective permissions for every subject, maps which subjects hold these escalation primitives, and produces remediation evidence. Source: Kubernetes RBAC Good Practices; Unit 42 Kubernetes RBAC research.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 262 lines · 57 tokens per session scan B ed8041e8d4e5
auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation is a skill published in the GitHub repository andycungkrinx91/konoha (12 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 2,920 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (reaches for credential files, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-25.
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