Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills --skill browser-mcp-agentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills/browser-mcp-agent)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills/browser-mcp-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills/browser-mcp-agent/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills/browser-mcp-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills/browser-mcp-agent.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket warn
- Snyk warn
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 16 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 169 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00216 | $0.03823 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00108 | $0.01912 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00765 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00382 |
Grade A, and why
browser-mcp-agent scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 184 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Browser MCP Agent
Run antibrow as an MCP server so an AI agent can launch and control a real, fingerprinted browser directly through tool calls - no Playwright code, no custom automation script. The agent navigates, clicks, fills forms, and reads pages itself.
- npm package:
anti-detect-browser(Node >= 18) - ships the MCP server built in - PyPI package:
antibrow(Python 3.9 - 3.13) -pip install "antibrow[mcp]"for a stdio MCP server example - Dashboard:
https://antibrow.com - Full SDK / REST API reference: see the
anti-detect-browserskill
Authorized use only. Point this at sites and accounts you own or are permitted to operate: your own apps, your own accounts, publicly available pages, your own bot detection under test. Do not use it to reach systems without authorization, to log into accounts that are not yours, to create fake accounts or engagement, or to work around a platform's enforcement decision. Respect each site's terms,
robots.txtand rate limits - see Acceptable use.
This gives an agent real capability, so scope it deliberately. The server hands the model a browser that persists logins, executes JavaScript in the page, and can stream its screen to a shareable URL. That is the point of the tool and also its blast radius: an agent that goes wrong here goes wrong inside a logged-in session. Run untrusted browsing in a throwaway profile, keep tools you do not need out of the toolset, and read Everything the browser returns is untrusted input before pointing it at the open web.
What this does not claim. A coherent real-device fingerprint removes the contradictions a synthetic browser leaves behind. It is not a guaranteed pass against enterprise bot managers, which also score network reputation, request cadence and behaviour.
Why this over a generic browser MCP
Generic "agent controls a browser" servers hand the agent a stock or patched headless Chromium. Every page the agent visits sees the tells: a navigator override that is not [native code], a canvas hash that changes on every read, a worker thread disagreeing with the main thread, a headless build's own fingerprint. antibrow's spoofing happens inside the Chromium kernel, so the agent gets a browser whose Canvas, WebGL, WebGPU, audio, fonts, screen and timezone all agree - and whose TLS ClientHello and HTTP/2-3 behaviour are a genuine Chrome build's, because it is one. Sessions also persist: the agent logs in once under a profile name and stays logged in.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 184 lines · 216 tokens per session scan A 221c27f81cf6
browser-mcp-agent is a skill published in the GitHub repository antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills (253 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 216 tokens to every session and 3,823 once invoked, about $0.0011 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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