Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/ao92265/claude-code-playbook/docker-checknpx skills add ao92265/claude-code-playbook --skill docker-checkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ao92265/claude-code-playbookWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ao92265/claude-code-playbook/docker-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ao92265/claude-code-playbook/docker-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ao92265/claude-code-playbook/docker-check.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00071 | $0.00573 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00287 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00115 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
docker-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Docker Environment Check
Validate Docker environment health before starting or debugging containerized services.
Steps
-
Check Docker daemon:
docker info > /dev/null 2>&1— is Docker running?- If not running, report and suggest starting it
- Check Docker version:
docker --version
-
List running containers:
docker ps --format "table {{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.Ports}}"- Flag any containers in unhealthy or restarting state
- Flag any containers using ports needed by the current project
-
Check port conflicts:
- Extract ports from
docker-compose.ymlorDockerfile - Check if those ports are already in use:
lsof -i :<port> - Report which process is using conflicting ports
- Extract ports from
-
Validate Docker Compose (if applicable):
docker compose config --quiet— is the compose file valid?- Check that all referenced images exist or can be built
- Check that all referenced volumes and networks are defined
- Verify environment variables and
.envfile presence
-
Check resource usage:
docker system df— disk usage by images, containers, volumes- Flag if disk usage is above 80%
- Suggest
docker system pruneif significant space can be reclaimed
-
Check image freshness:
- List local images relevant to the project
- Flag images older than 30 days that might be stale
- Check if base images have security updates available
-
Report summary:
- Docker status: running/stopped
- Containers: X running, Y stopped, Z unhealthy
- Port conflicts: list or "none"
- Disk usage: X GB used
- Recommendations: actions to take before starting services
Important
- Don't start or stop containers automatically — report findings and let the user decide.
- Don't expose secrets from container environment variables in the report.
- Check compose file format — v2 vs v3 syntax differences can cause subtle issues.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 66 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 258c3548ab49
docker-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository ao92265/claude-code-playbook (10 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 573 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
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compute-env-setup
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securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
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detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.