struts: Skill for Claude Code

.claude/skills/triaging-security-reports/SKILL.md

triaging-security-reports is a skill for Claude Code from apache/struts. It costs 63 tokens per session (2,107 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A method for independently investigating reported security problems in Apache Struts instead of accepting the reporter's conclusion.

In plain words
What is it for?
Triaging vulnerability reports, assessing CVE or injection claims, and drafting evidence-based replies to security researchers.
Why use it?
It requires every claim, verdict, and mitigation to be checked against the current source code before responding.

Skill for Claude Code ✓ vendor

Written for Claude Code: installed under .claude/. Also seen: mentions CLAUDE.md.

This is apache/struts's own configuration. It tells Claude Code how to work on struts itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything struts configures →

About the project

Apache Struts is an open-source Java web framework that helps developers build applications using the Model-View-Controller pattern, separating data and business logic from page presentation and request handling. Java developers use it to create dynamic web applications with interactive forms and database-backed behavior. The catalogue's skills, instructions, and setting support work with Struts projects.

apache/struts · 1,371 stars · on GitHub · struts.apache.org

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to apache/struts. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/apache/struts/main/.claude/skills/triaging-security-reports/SKILL.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/apache/struts

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for triaging-security-reports

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for triaging-security-reports

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/apache/struts/triaging-security-reports.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 63 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,107 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high YARA Match · line 67
    YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
    Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 67
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
  • medium Excessive Agency · line 109
    Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
    Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00063 $0.02107
Opus 5.5 $0.00025 $0.00843
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00013 $0.00421
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00211

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 1050a3feedb1, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

triaging-security-reports scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/triaging-security-reports/SKILL.md · 129 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Triaging Security Reports

Overview

A security report is a claim to be tested, not a finding to be confirmed or rebutted. The reporter may be right, wrong, partially right, or right about the symptom and wrong about the cause. Your job is to independently re-derive the truth from current source.

Core principle: Every factual statement that ends up in your assessment or reply — the reporter's claims and your own — must be traced to current source code before you write it down. The most common failure is not believing the reporter; it is inventing supporting facts to justify a verdict you already reached.

Process authority: SECURITY.md is the source of truth for the disclosure process (private handling, assessment checklist, reporting rules). Read it. This skill governs how you research and respond, not the process itself.

The Iron Rule

NO CLAIM IN A SECURITY RESPONSE WITHOUT A FILE:LINE YOU READ THIS SESSION.

Applies to the verdict, every mitigation you cite, and every "default" you state. If you can't point to the line, you can't write the sentence.

Research: report-blind, not report-led

Read the report once to know what to investigate. Then research as if you were auditing that area cold — do not let the report's framing drive your search.

For each claim, independently verify:

Reporter asserts You must verify from source
A line number ("bug is at X:392") Read that line and its call path — is it even reachable as described?
A severity / CVSS Re-derive from actual exploitability, not their number
"No mitigation / no gate exists" Search for gates, filters, allowlists, authorizers yourself — absence claims are the most often wrong
"Default configuration" Check the effective runtime default, not one source (see trap below)
"Same as CVE-XXXX" Confirm the mechanism actually matches; analogy ≠ equivalence
A working PoC Run it if it is runnable, then trace whether the payload survives every filter on the path

Read the full file on GitHub · 129 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago Changed · +2 lines 1050a3feedb1
  2. 1mo ago Changed · +28 lines 5595d83885b0
  3. 1mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A 726ce4ac50ac

Subscribe to this mod's changes

triaging-security-reports is a skill published in the GitHub repository apache/struts (1,371 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 2,107 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.