Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/arbazkhan971/godmodenpx agentmods add skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infraWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infra)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infra"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infra/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infra"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/arbazkhan971/godmode/infra.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 139 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 141 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 170 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00058 | $0.01687 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00843 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00337 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00169 |
Grade A, and why
infra scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 250 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Infra — Infrastructure as Code
Activate When
- User invokes
/godmode:infra - User says "terraform plan", "provision infrastructure"
- User says "check drift", "estimate costs"
- Deployment requires new cloud resources
Workflow
Step 1: Discover Infrastructure Context
# Detect IaC tool
ls *.tf template.yaml Pulumi.yaml cdk.json \
2>/dev/null
# Check state backend
grep -r 'backend\s*"s3"\|backend\s*"gcs"' *.tf \
2>/dev/null
# List existing resources
terraform state list 2>/dev/null | head -20
INFRASTRUCTURE CONTEXT:
IaC Tool: Terraform | CloudFormation | Pulumi | CDK
Provider: AWS | GCP | Azure | Multi-cloud
State: S3 | GCS | Azure Blob | Terraform Cloud | Local
Environments: dev | staging | production
IF no IaC detected: scaffold new project
IF state is local: migrate to remote immediately
IF no policy checks: add OPA/Sentinel
Step 2: Validate Infrastructure
# Terraform validation
terraform fmt -check -recursive
terraform validate
terraform init -backend=false
terraform plan -out=tfplan
# CloudFormation validation
aws cloudformation validate-template \
--template-body file://template.yaml
cfn-lint template.yaml
# Pulumi / CDK
pulumi preview --diff
cdk synth && cdk diff
Step 3: Security & Policy Enforcement
POLICY CHECKLIST:
[ ] No public S3 buckets or storage
[ ] No SGs with 0.0.0.0/0 on sensitive ports
[ ] Encryption at rest on all data stores
[ ] TLS 1.2+ enforced in transit
[ ] No hardcoded secrets in IaC
[ ] IAM least-privilege (no * actions)
[ ] All resources tagged: env, team, cost-center
[ ] VPC flow logs enabled
[ ] CloudTrail / audit logging enabled
THRESHOLDS:
CRITICAL: public data store, leaked secrets, * IAM
HIGH: missing encryption, no tags, no audit logs
MEDIUM: suboptimal instance type, missing flow logs
IF any CRITICAL: block deployment immediately
Step 4: Cost Estimation
# Infracost for Terraform
infracost breakdown --path .
infracost diff --path . \
--compare-to infracost-base.json
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 250 lines · 58 tokens per session scan A ba910f102822
infra is a skill published in the GitHub repository arbazkhan971/godmode (26 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 1,687 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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health
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orca-account-health
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