Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/arindamxd/camerax-android/android-intent-securitynpx skills add arindamxd/camerax-android --skill android-intent-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/arindamxd/camerax-androidWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/arindamxd/camerax-android/android-intent-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/arindamxd/camerax-android/android-intent-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/arindamxd/camerax-android/android-intent-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00053 | $0.04947 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.02474 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00989 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00495 |
Grade A, and why
android-intent-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
98% identical to android-intent-security — 83 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 531 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
This skill provides guidelines and patterns to secure Android components (Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, Content Providers) and handle Intents safely, preventing privilege escalation and unauthorized access.
Glossary
- Intent: An asynchronous messaging object used to request an action from another app component.
- Exported component: A component (
android:exported="true") that can be launched by other apps on the device. - Sticky intent: A broadcast intent that remains in the system cache after it's sent, allowing any app to retrieve its contents.
- Signature permission: A permission whose protection level is set to
signature, granted only to apps signed with the same developer key. - onNewIntent: An activity lifecycle callback invoked when an activity is launched with
FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOPand is already running at the top of the history stack. - PendingIntent: A token granted to a foreign application (for example, system services) allowing it to execute a predefined Intent with the creator's permissions.
- Mutable PendingIntent: A PendingIntent whose underlying Intent parameters can be modified by the receiving application.
- ContentProvider: A component that encapsulates data and provides it to other applications via standard query/insert interfaces.
- IntentSanitizer: A utility class in AndroidX Core used to build a safe, sanitized copy of an incoming Intent by filtering out unauthorized components, actions, or extras.
- Intent redirection (forwarding): A vulnerability where an application receives an intent from an untrusted source and uses it to launch a private, non-exported component.
Prerequisites
- The agent MUST be able to describe the function and security implications of
onCreate,onNewIntent, and thesingleToplaunch mode. - The agent MUST be able to declare
<activity>,<service>,<receiver>, and<provider>tags inAndroidManifest.xmland define theirandroid:exportedandandroid:permissionattributes. - The agent MUST be able to implement signature verification checks using
PackageManager.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 531 lines · 53 tokens per session scan A 1ead5cbeac62
android-intent-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository arindamxd/camerax-android (132 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 4,947 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 98% identical to android-intent-security, differing in 83 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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