Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add aspectrr/deer --skill elasticsearch-security-troubleshootinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aspectrr/deerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aspectrr/deer/elasticsearch-security-troubleshooting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aspectrr/deer/elasticsearch-security-troubleshooting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aspectrr/deer/elasticsearch-security-troubleshooting.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 232 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 408 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 232 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 408 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 70 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 150 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 183 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Excessive Agency · line 232 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 260 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 313 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.03851 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01925 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00770 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00385 |
Grade A, and why
elasticsearch-security-troubleshooting scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl <auth_flags> "${ELASTICSEARCH_URL}/_security/_authenticate" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 410 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Elasticsearch Security Troubleshooting
Diagnose and resolve common Elasticsearch security issues. This skill provides a structured triage workflow for authentication failures, authorization errors, TLS problems, API key issues, role mapping mismatches, Kibana login failures, and license-expiry lockouts.
For authentication methods and API key management, see the elasticsearch-authn skill. For roles, users, and role mappings, see the elasticsearch-authz skill. For license management, see the elasticsearch-license skill.
For diagnostic API endpoints, see references/api-reference.md.
Deployment note: Diagnostic API availability differs between self-managed, ECH, and Serverless. See Deployment Compatibility for details.
Jobs to Be Done
- Diagnose HTTP 401 authentication failures
- Diagnose HTTP 403 permission denied errors
- Troubleshoot TLS/SSL handshake or certificate errors
- Investigate expired or invalid API keys
- Debug role mappings that do not grant expected roles
- Fix Kibana login failures, redirect loops, or CORS errors
- Recover from a license-expiry lockout
- Determine why a user lacks access to a specific index
Prerequisites
| Item | Description |
|---|---|
| Elasticsearch URL | Cluster endpoint (e.g. https://localhost:9200 or a Cloud deployment URL) |
| Authentication | Any valid credentials — even minimal — to reach the cluster |
| Cluster privileges | monitor for read-only diagnostics; manage_security for fixes |
Prompt the user for any missing values. If the user cannot authenticate at all, start with TLS and Certificate Errors or License Expiry Recovery.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 410 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 365ef836ccef
elasticsearch-security-troubleshooting is a skill published in the GitHub repository aspectrr/deer (404 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 3,851 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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