Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to auerbachb/claude-code-config. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/auerbachb/claude-code-config/main/.claude/skills/leave-by/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/auerbachb/claude-code-configWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/leave-by)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/leave-by"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/leave-by/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/leave-by"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/leave-by.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 140 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 934 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00137 | $0.26252 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00055 | $0.10501 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.05250 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.02625 |
Grade A, and why
leave-by scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,493 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You say the time once. From then on the thread plans around it: nothing starts that cannot finish before it, a check-in arrives at a lead time ahead of it, and the wind-down runs itself so that by the declared time everything is merged or cleanly resumable.
This skill is a thin layer over three mechanisms that already exist. It arms /pm Step 0b's
planning window (issue #1325) at the declared time, it schedules /pause (issue #1482) to run at
deadline − lead, and it renders /subagent's "Running now" table (issue #1512) with one added
verdict column. It is not a second pause implementation, a second deadline field, or a second
scheduler — every one of those would be a place for the two copies to disagree.
Arming a leave time does not turn this thread into a /pm thread. It writes repo-scoped state
that any execution-capable thread reads; it imports no ranking, no backlog scan, and no day loop.
Step 0: Resolve helpers, repo key, and mode
resolve_script() {
local name="$1" candidate
for candidate in \
"$HOME/.claude/skills-worktree/.claude/scripts/$name" \
"$HOME/.claude/scripts/$name" \
".claude/scripts/$name"; do
if [[ -x "$candidate" ]]; then echo "$candidate"; return 0; fi
done
return 1
}
SESSION_STATE_SH=$(resolve_script session-state.sh) || SESSION_STATE_SH=""
WINDOW_PLAN_SH=$(resolve_script window-plan.sh) || WINDOW_PLAN_SH=""
PM_CONFIG_GET=$(resolve_script pm-config-get.sh) || PM_CONFIG_GET=""
ESTIMATE_RESOLVE_SH=$(resolve_script estimate-resolve.sh) || ESTIMATE_RESOLVE_SH=""
OVERRUN_CHECK_SH=$(resolve_script overrun-check.sh) || OVERRUN_CHECK_SH=""
TABLE_FRESHNESS_SH=$(resolve_script table-freshness.sh) || TABLE_FRESHNESS_SH=""
REPO_KEY=""
[[ -n "$SESSION_STATE_SH" ]] && { REPO_KEY=$("$SESSION_STATE_SH" --repo-key 2>/dev/null) || REPO_KEY=""; }
# `--repo-key` NEVER returns empty: it prints `_unknown` and exits 0 when no
# repo resolves, so the empty-REPO_KEY branch below cannot fire without this.
# Left unnormalised, the check-in's `--note-rendered` writes under `_unknown`
# while the armed watch polls the real repo — the render is recorded where
# nothing looks, and the floor fires forever against a board being re-rendered.
[[ "$REPO_KEY" == "_unknown" ]] && REPO_KEY=""
session-state.shorwindow-plan.shunresolved, or an emptyREPO_KEY→ required. PrintERROR: <name> not found (checked all three paths) — leave-time arming unavailable(orERROR: repo key unresolved — leave-time arming unavailable) and stop. A leave time that is not persisted is a promise nothing will keep; refusing is the honest failure.pm-config-get.shunresolved → degraded:DEGRADED: pm-config-get.sh not found (checked all three paths) — lead time falls back to 30 min, then continue.table-freshness.shunresolved → degraded:DEGRADED: table-freshness.sh not found (checked all three paths) — hourly table-freshness floor unavailable; re-render the "Running now" table on every heartbeat instead, then continue. Same wording and same direction as/subagentStep 0: the check-in still prints (Step 8.3), it just goes unrecorded, and failing toward more table renders is correct.estimate-resolve.sh/overrun-check.shunresolved → degraded: the check-in table loses its Est and clock columns (unestimated/—), and every started row's verdict falls toparks(Step 8). Say so in one line; never skip the check-in.
Modes, decided before anything else. Parse the internal fields first so a Monitor-emitted event can never be reinterpreted as a fresh declaration:
| Invocation | Mode |
|---|---|
--checkin --generation <token> |
check-in (Step 8) — internal; only the Monitor armed in Step 6 emits it |
--elicit |
elicit (Step 0e) — internal; /subagent Step 7 asks the user for the time, then arms Steps 1–5 only (no Monitor) |
cancel / off / "never mind, I'm staying" |
cancel (Step 9) |
status |
status — print the armed line from Step 7 and stop; write nothing |
| anything else, or a leave-time phrase recognized in chat | declare — Step 9 first when one is already armed, then Steps 1–7 |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +8 lines 2a3596add06c
- 1mo ago Changed · +423 lines cf5839ade517
- 1mo ago First seen · 1,062 lines · 137 tokens per session scan A 05566dcf55cf
leave-by is a skill published in the GitHub repository auerbachb/claude-code-config (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 137 tokens to every session and 26,252 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
Other skills, from other repositories
skeptic
Adversarial reviewer for Bug Hunter. Challenges each behavioral finding against actual code, checks defenses, and preserves unresolved cases for independent review.
referee
Final arbiter for Bug Hunter. Independently verifies behavioral findings, resolves Skeptic challenges, and calibrates severity and confidence.
commit-security-scan
Scan code changes for security vulnerabilities using Bug Hunter-native artifacts and STRIDE context. Use whenever the user asks for PR security review, commit-diff scanning, staged-change security checks, branch-comparison security review, or pre-merge security analysis of changed code.
robin
Use whenever an agent creates, updates, reviews, or completes a GitHub pull request. Detect whether Robin is installed in the repository; when it is, automatically drive the PR through a bounded review, verified-fix, reply, thread-resolution, re-review, authorized-merge, and cleanup loop without requiring the user to…
adr
Create and manage Architecture Decision Records. Documents significant technical decisions with context, alternatives, and consequences. Also supports evaluate (assess proposals) and design (system design) modes.
deploy-checklist
Pre-deployment verification checklist. Generates customized checklists based on tech-stack with rollback triggers. Auto-invoked by /draft:upload.