Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/argusnpx skills add Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill argusgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00166 | $0.01943 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00083 | $0.00971 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00389 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00194 |
Grade A, and why
argus scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
> `urllib` strips raw `\r\n` from URLs by design — the **encoded** variants are How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 143 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ARGUS — THE ALL-SEEING SCANNER SUITE
Named for Argus Panoptes, the hundred-eyed giant. Six "eyes" that surface what ordinary scans miss: two of the most common web2 classes (CORS, CRLF), the NoSQL "db" surface, JWT forging, blind-bug confirmation via OOB (the eye that sees the invisible — unblocks an entire severity band), and automated LLM red-teaming. All pure-Python, no new deps. Core logic is offline-testable.
0. ROUTING — which tool for what
| Signal on the target | Tool / command |
|---|---|
API reflects Origin, or ACAO/ACAC headers seen |
/cors |
Param reaches a redirect / Location / log / response header |
/crlf |
JSON login or {user,pass} body, Mongo/Mongoose stack |
/nosqli |
Authorization: Bearer ey... / JWT in cookie or storage |
/jwt-scan |
| Suspected blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE (no in-band signal) | /oob |
| Chatbot / agent / LLM feature | /llm-redteam |
1. CORS — /cors
tools/cors_scanner.py https://api.target.com/me --cookie "session=..."
tools/cors_scanner.py -l recon/target.com/urls/api.txt --json
Sends crafted Origin headers, classifies Access-Control-Allow-Origin /
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials:
- CRITICAL — reflects attacker origin with
ACAC: true→ cookie-auth'd cross-origin read (account-data exfil). - HIGH —
nullorigin trusted with credentials. - MEDIUM — reflects without creds (exploitable when auth = non-cookie token), or trusts http downgrade.
- Probes suffix/prefix regex bypass (
target.com.evil,notarget.com) and subdomain trust (chains with takeover).
Always pass --cookie with a live session — the credentialed path is the win.
2. CRLF / host-header — /crlf
tools/crlf_scanner.py "https://target.com/r?u=x" --host-header
Injects encoded CRLF (%0d%0a, double-encoded, UTF-8 overlong %E5%98%8A%E5%98%8D)
trying to land Set-Cookie: crlftest=1 in the response. --host-header also tests
Host / X-Forwarded-Host / Forwarded injection and flags attacker-host
reflection in Location (password-reset poisoning). Impact: session fixation,
open redirect, cache poisoning, reset poisoning.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 143 lines · 166 tokens per session scan A 5a2803f30da1
argus is a skill published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 166 tokens to every session and 1,943 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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