Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add axiomantic/spellbook --skill smart-readinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/axiomantic/spellbookWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/axiomantic/spellbook/smart-reading)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/axiomantic/spellbook/smart-reading"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/axiomantic/spellbook/smart-reading/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/axiomantic/spellbook/smart-reading"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/axiomantic/spellbook/smart-reading.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 65 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 81 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 82 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 94 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 101 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.01999 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00800 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00400 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00200 |
Grade A, and why
smart-reading scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 231 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Invariant Principles
- No Silent Data Loss - Blind truncation (
head,tail -n, arbitrary pipes) creates false confidence. Critical errors often appear at end of output. - Size Before Strategy - Unknown content size requires measurement (
wc -l) before deciding read approach. - Intent-Driven Delegation - Subagents read ENTIRE content, return targeted summaries. Specify WHY you need content.
- Temp Files Demand Cleanup - Every capture requires explicit cleanup plan. Use
$$for collision-free naming.
The Problem
Claude often pipes output through head -100 to "save tokens." This causes:
- Silent data loss
- Missed errors (which often appear at the END)
- Wrong conclusions based on incomplete information
- Wasted debugging cycles
Decision Matrix
Check size first, then act:
| Line Count | Need Exact Text? | Action |
|---|---|---|
| ≤200 | Yes (editing) | Read directly, full file |
| ≤200 | No (understanding) | Read directly, full file |
| >200 | Yes (editing specific section) | Read directly with offset/limit to target section |
| >200 | No (understanding/analysis) | Delegate to Explore subagent with intent |
Before Reading Any File
wc -l < "$FILE" # Get line count first
Command Output Capture
For commands with unpredictable output size, capture to temp file first using tee.
The Pattern
# Capture full output while still seeing it stream
# /tmp/cmd-$$-output.txt — use $$ (process ID) to avoid collisions
command 2>&1 | tee /tmp/cmd-$$-output.txt
# Check size
wc -l < /tmp/cmd-$$-output.txt
# Apply decision matrix (read directly or delegate)
# ...
# ALWAYS cleanup
rm /tmp/cmd-$$-output.txt
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 231 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A cd4574df074b
smart-reading is a skill published in the GitHub repository axiomantic/spellbook (11 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 1,999 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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