Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit --skill threat-model-gategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/threat-model-gate)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/threat-model-gate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/threat-model-gate/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/threat-model-gate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit/threat-model-gate.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 7 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 285 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.03106 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.01242 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00621 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00311 |
Grade A, and why
threat-model-gate scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 303 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Model Gate
Overview
Security cannot be added later. Features that touch user data, system boundaries, or trust relationships require threat modeling during planning — not after code is written.
Core Principle
Every feature that handles user data, authentication, or system boundaries requires explicit threat modeling before implementation.
"We'll secure it in the next sprint" is a commitment that never gets honored. The cost of retrofitting security is 10x the cost of designing it in. Threat modeling during planning is the minimum viable security practice.
When to Activate
Apply this gate when planning involves any of the following:
Authentication and Identity
- Login flows, session management, token issuance or validation
- Multi-factor authentication, SSO, OAuth, OIDC, SAML
- Password storage, credential management, account recovery
Authorization and Access Control
- Role-based or attribute-based access control (RBAC, ABAC)
- Resource ownership and sharing models
- Admin capabilities, privilege escalation paths
- API key or service account permissions
Data Handling
- PII collection, storage, or transmission
- Payment card data, health records, or regulated data categories
- Encryption at rest or in transit
- Data retention, deletion, or export features
API Design
- Public-facing endpoints, webhooks, or callbacks
- Inter-service communication with trust implications
- Rate limiting and abuse prevention
- Input validation and output encoding boundaries
Cryptography
- Key generation, storage, or rotation
- Algorithm selection (hashing, signing, encryption)
- Certificate management, mTLS
- Secure random number generation
Network and Infrastructure
- Firewall rules, network segmentation, VPN configurations
- Load balancer, reverse proxy, or CDN configurations
- Container networking, service mesh, Kubernetes network policies
- DNS, TLS termination, certificate pinning
The Threat Modeling Checklist
Work through these four areas before committing to an implementation approach:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 303 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 999dbc5370b6
threat-model-gate is a skill published in the GitHub repository backspace-shmackspace/claude-devkit (15 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 3,106 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
architect
Produces Alon's design-doc system before code: SOURCEOFTRUTH.md, ARCHITECTUREROADMAP.md, TODOWORKFLOW.md, CLAUDE.md, plus a modular docs/architecture set for larger projects. Model first: data and invariants before framework, every invariant enforced at two boundaries, failure paths designed as deliberately as happy…
ponytail
Forces the laziest solution that actually works: YAGNI, reuse before new code, stdlib before custom, native platform before dependencies, one line before fifty. Three levels — lite (name the lazier alternative, build what's asked), full (ladder enforced, default), ultra (YAGNI extremist, challenge the requirement…
review-swarm
Local, free, multi-specialist review of a diff: parallel Claude subagents for correctness, security/trust boundaries, data/perf, architecture-altitude, ponytail-simplicity, and tests/failure-paths, each non-trivial finding adversarially verified before being kept, deduped, and ranked into a Blockers / Should-fix /…
ask-the-council
Convenes a panel of opinionated Claude advisors, each with a distinct mandate and a forbidden move so they genuinely diverge, then a Chairman synthesis that commits to one recommendation with the decisive tradeoff and the strongest dissent named.
prompt-generator
Turns a vague ask into a rigorous, grounded, token-efficient prompt for another agent or LLM: role and objective, testable done criteria, anti-hallucination and anti-tokenmaxing rules baked into the generated prompt itself, and strict agent discipline for coding-agent hand-offs.
up-to-date
Preflight sync and situational brief before repo work: fetches origin, reports ahead/behind divergence (with a no-upstream/detached-HEAD fallback), recent commits, open PRs and issues touching the work, and dirty-tree warnings, then names one recommended first action. Read-only by default — never pulls, rebases…