Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill dast-scanninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/dast-scanning)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/dast-scanning"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/dast-scanning/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/dast-scanning"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/dast-scanning.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 285 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 46 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 59 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 65 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 78 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 89 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 155 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 240 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- low Tool Misuse · line 59 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 65 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 78 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 89 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 155 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.02344 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01172 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00469 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00234 |
Grade A, and why
dast-scanning scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
response = requests.post( How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 400 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DAST Scanning
Test running applications for security vulnerabilities through dynamic analysis.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Testing deployed applications
- Performing automated security scans
- Finding runtime vulnerabilities
- Testing authentication flows
- Validating API security
Prerequisites
- Running application instance
- Network access to target
- Testing authorization
- Understanding of web security
Tool Overview
| Tool | Type | Best For |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP ZAP | OSS | Automated scanning, CI |
| Burp Suite | Commercial | Manual testing, advanced |
| Nikto | OSS | Web server scanning |
| Nuclei | OSS | Template-based scanning |
| Arachni | OSS | Comprehensive scanning |
OWASP ZAP
Docker Setup
# Run ZAP in daemon mode
docker run -d --name zap \
-p 8080:8080 \
-v $(pwd)/reports:/zap/reports \
ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable \
zap.sh -daemon -host 0.0.0.0 -port 8080 \
-config api.addrs.addr.name=.* \
-config api.addrs.addr.regex=true
Baseline Scan
# Quick baseline scan
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/zap/wrk \
ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable \
zap-baseline.py -t https://target.example.com \
-r baseline-report.html
# With authentication
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/zap/wrk \
ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable \
zap-baseline.py -t https://target.example.com \
-r report.html \
--auth-login-url https://target.example.com/login \
--auth-username user \
--auth-password pass
Full Scan
# Comprehensive scan
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/zap/wrk \
ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable \
zap-full-scan.py -t https://target.example.com \
-r full-report.html \
-J full-report.json
API Scan
# OpenAPI specification scan
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/zap/wrk \
ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable \
zap-api-scan.py -t https://target.example.com/openapi.json \
-f openapi \
-r api-report.html
ZAP Automation Framework
# zap-automation.yaml
env:
contexts:
- name: "Default Context"
urls:
- "https://target.example.com"
includePaths:
- "https://target.example.com/.*"
excludePaths:
- "https://target.example.com/logout.*"
authentication:
method: "form"
parameters:
loginUrl: "https://target.example.com/login"
loginRequestData: "username={%username%}&password={%password%}"
verification:
method: "response"
loggedInRegex: "\\QWelcome\\E"
users:
- name: "testuser"
credentials:
username: "[email protected]"
password: "password123"
jobs:
- type: spider
parameters:
context: "Default Context"
user: "testuser"
maxDuration: 10
- type: spiderAjax
parameters:
context: "Default Context"
user: "testuser"
maxDuration: 10
- type: passiveScan-wait
parameters:
maxDuration: 5
- type: activeScan
parameters:
context: "Default Context"
user: "testuser"
policy: "Default Policy"
- type: report
parameters:
template: "traditional-html"
reportDir: "/zap/reports"
reportFile: "zap-report"
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 400 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 9c499ad3eb90
dast-scanning is a skill published in the GitHub repository BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (1,067 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 2,344 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
screen-reader-testing
Test web applications with screen readers including VoiceOver, NVDA, and JAWS. Use when validating screen reader compatibility, debugging accessibility issues, or ensuring assistive technology support.
e2e-testing-patterns
Master end-to-end testing with Playwright and Cypress to build reliable test suites that catch bugs, improve confidence, and enable fast deployment. Use when implementing E2E tests, debugging flaky tests, or establishing testing standards.
browser-testing-with-screenshots
Use when testing web applications with visual verification - automates Chrome browser interactions, element selection, and screenshot capture for confirming UI functionality.
nw-spike
Runs a timeboxed PROBE to validate one core assumption, then optionally PROMOTES the probe into a walking skeleton — the first e2e thin slice of the feature, committed and demo-able. Use after DISCUSS when the feature involves a new mechanism, performance requirement, or external integration.
nw-bdd-methodology
BDD patterns for acceptance test design - Given-When-Then structure, scenario writing rules, pytest-bdd implementation, anti-patterns, and living documentation.
nw-test-organization-conventions
Test directory structure patterns by architecture style, language conventions, naming rules, and fixture placement. Decision tree for selecting test organization strategy.