Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill incident-responsegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/incident-response)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/incident-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/incident-response/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/incident-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/incident-response.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 132 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 138 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 133 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 139 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high YARA Match · line 148 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 139 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 250 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 259 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 269 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 278 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.04632 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.02316 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00926 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00463 |
Grade B, and why
incident-response scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
cat /etc/shadow > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/shadow.txt" 2>/dev/null || true Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 521 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Incident Response
Handle security incidents effectively with structured response procedures.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Responding to an active security incident (breach, malware, unauthorized access)
- Building incident response playbooks and runbooks
- Conducting IR tabletop exercises and drills
- Setting up evidence collection and forensic capabilities
- Establishing communication protocols for security events
- Performing post-incident reviews and process improvements
Prerequisites
- IR team roster with on-call rotation and escalation paths
- Secure communication channel (separate from production systems)
- Forensic workstation with analysis tools installed
- Evidence storage with chain-of-custody controls
- Legal counsel contact information
- Pre-authorized incident response actions documented
Incident Response Phases
phases:
1_preparation:
- IR team roster and 24/7 contact info
- Tools and privileged access ready
- Playbooks documented and tested
- Evidence collection kit prepared
- Communication templates drafted
2_detection:
- Alert triage and validation
- Initial assessment and scoping
- Severity classification
- Incident ticket creation
3_containment:
- Short-term containment (stop bleeding)
- Evidence preservation (before changes)
- System isolation (network/host level)
- Credential rotation if needed
4_eradication:
- Root cause analysis
- Remove threat actor access
- Patch exploited vulnerabilities
- Clean compromised systems
5_recovery:
- System restoration from clean backups
- Enhanced monitoring deployment
- Phased return to production
- Business continuity verification
6_lessons_learned:
- Post-incident review (within 72 hours)
- Timeline reconstruction
- Documentation update
- Process and detection improvements
Severity Classification
| Level | Impact | Response Time | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical (P1) | Active data breach, full outage, ransomware | Immediate (< 15 min) | Data exfiltration in progress, ransomware spreading |
| High (P2) | Service degraded, potential breach | < 1 hour | Unauthorized admin access, malware detected |
| Medium (P3) | Limited impact, contained | < 4 hours | Phishing compromise (single user), policy violation |
| Low (P4) | Minimal impact | Next business day | Failed brute force, blocked scanning activity |
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 521 lines · 37 tokens per session scan B aa6a7db3fe0e
incident-response is a skill published in the GitHub repository BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (1,084 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 4,632 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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