Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skillsnpx agentmods add skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storageWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/object-storage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 86 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 59 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 62 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 65 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 68 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 349 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 71 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 74 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 77 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 80 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 234 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.02675 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.01337 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00535 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00267 |
Grade A, and why
object-storage scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 363 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Object Storage
Configure and manage object storage solutions including AWS S3, MinIO (self-hosted), and compatible providers. Covers CLI operations, bucket policies, lifecycle rules, versioning, encryption, and the MinIO client (mc).
When to Use
- Storing application assets, backups, logs, or media files
- Setting up an S3-compatible object store on-premises with MinIO
- Configuring lifecycle rules to transition or expire objects automatically
- Implementing access control with bucket policies and IAM
- Syncing data between local filesystems and object storage
- Serving static content from S3 or MinIO
Prerequisites
- AWS CLI v2 installed and configured (
aws configure) for S3 operations - Docker installed for MinIO self-hosted setup
- MinIO client (
mc) installed for MinIO management - IAM credentials with appropriate S3 permissions
- Network access to the object storage endpoint
AWS S3 CLI Operations
Bucket Management
# Create a new bucket
aws s3 mb s3://my-app-assets-prod
# Create a bucket in a specific region
aws s3 mb s3://my-app-assets-eu --region eu-west-1
# List all buckets
aws s3 ls
# List objects in a bucket (with sizes)
aws s3 ls s3://my-app-assets-prod --recursive --human-readable --summarize
# Delete an empty bucket
aws s3 rb s3://my-old-bucket
# Delete a bucket and ALL its contents (destructive)
aws s3 rb s3://my-old-bucket --force
Upload and Download
# Upload a single file
aws s3 cp ./report.pdf s3://my-app-assets-prod/reports/
# Upload with a specific storage class
aws s3 cp ./archive.tar.gz s3://my-app-assets-prod/archives/ --storage-class GLACIER
# Upload with server-side encryption (AES-256)
aws s3 cp ./sensitive.dat s3://my-app-assets-prod/data/ --sse AES256
# Download a file
aws s3 cp s3://my-app-assets-prod/reports/report.pdf ./downloads/
# Sync a local directory to S3 (upload only changed files)
aws s3 sync ./build/ s3://my-app-assets-prod/static/ --delete
# Sync from S3 to local
aws s3 sync s3://my-app-assets-prod/static/ ./local-copy/
# Sync with exclusion patterns
aws s3 sync ./logs/ s3://my-app-logs/ --exclude "*.tmp" --exclude ".git/*"
# Copy between buckets
aws s3 sync s3://source-bucket/ s3://destination-bucket/ --source-region us-east-1 --region eu-west-1
# Generate a pre-signed URL (temporary access, 1 hour)
aws s3 presign s3://my-app-assets-prod/reports/report.pdf --expires-in 3600
# Recursive delete of a prefix
aws s3 rm s3://my-app-assets-prod/old-data/ --recursive
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 363 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 650289d4c1f7
object-storage is a skill published in the GitHub repository BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (1,084 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 2,675 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
ec2
AWS EC2 virtual machine management — instances, security groups, key pairs, AMIs, EBS volumes, Auto Scaling Groups, Spot Instances, Session Manager, placement groups, and instance lifecycle automation. Trigger on ANY of these, even when EC2 isn't named explicitly: - Launching or provisioning: "spin up a server"…
eventbridge
AWS EventBridge serverless event bus for event-driven architectures. Use when creating rules, configuring event patterns, setting up scheduled events, integrating with SaaS, or building cross-account event routing.
s3
AWS S3 object storage for bucket management, object operations, and access control. Use when creating buckets, uploading files, configuring lifecycle policies, setting up static websites, managing permissions, or implementing cross-region replication.
sqs
AWS SQS message queue service for decoupled architectures. Use when creating queues, configuring dead-letter queues, managing visibility timeouts, implementing FIFO ordering, or integrating with Lambda.
iam
AWS Identity and Access Management for users, roles, policies, and permissions. Use when creating IAM policies, configuring cross-account access, setting up service roles, troubleshooting permission errors, or managing access control.