Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 260 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 374 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.03633 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01817 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00727 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00363 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 462 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling
Identify and mitigate security threats during system design.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Designing a new system, service, or feature
- Making significant architectural changes to existing systems
- Onboarding a new third-party integration or dependency
- Preparing for security audits or compliance reviews
- Responding to a security incident to improve defenses
- Reviewing infrastructure changes that affect trust boundaries
Prerequisites
- System architecture documentation or design diagrams
- Access to development and operations teams for context
- Understanding of the system's data classification (PII, PHI, financial, etc.)
- OWASP Threat Dragon or Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool (optional but helpful)
- Whiteboard or diagramming tool for collaborative sessions
STRIDE Methodology
| Threat | Description | Property Violated | Mitigation Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Pretending to be another user or system | Authentication | MFA, mTLS, API key validation, certificate pinning |
| Tampering | Modifying data in transit or at rest | Integrity | HMAC, digital signatures, checksums, immutable logs |
| Repudiation | Denying having performed an action | Non-repudiation | Audit logging, digital signatures, tamper-evident logs |
| Information Disclosure | Exposing data to unauthorized parties | Confidentiality | Encryption (TLS, AES), access controls, data masking |
| Denial of Service | Making service unavailable | Availability | Rate limiting, autoscaling, CDN, circuit breakers |
| Elevation of Privilege | Gaining unauthorized higher access | Authorization | RBAC, principle of least privilege, input validation |
STRIDE Worksheet Template
# stride-worksheet.yaml - Fill out one per component/trust boundary crossing
component:
name: "API Gateway"
owner: "Platform Team"
data_classification: "Confidential"
trust_boundary: "External -> Internal"
threats:
- id: T001
category: Spoofing
description: "Attacker forges JWT tokens to impersonate users"
attack_vector: "Stolen signing key or weak algorithm (HS256 with guessable secret)"
likelihood: Medium
impact: Critical
risk_score: 15 # likelihood(3) x impact(5)
existing_controls:
- "JWT validation on every request"
- "RS256 algorithm with rotated keys"
gaps:
- "No token binding to device/IP"
recommended_mitigations:
- "Add token binding claims"
- "Implement short-lived tokens (15 min) with refresh"
- "Monitor for token reuse from different IPs"
status: "Mitigated (partial)"
owner: "Auth Team"
- id: T002
category: Tampering
description: "Man-in-the-middle modifies API requests"
attack_vector: "Compromised network between client and gateway"
likelihood: Low
impact: High
risk_score: 8
existing_controls:
- "TLS 1.3 enforced"
- "HSTS enabled"
gaps: []
recommended_mitigations:
- "Certificate pinning for mobile clients"
status: "Mitigated"
owner: "Platform Team"
- id: T003
category: Information Disclosure
description: "Verbose error messages leak internal details"
attack_vector: "Triggering errors returns stack traces, internal IPs, DB schema"
likelihood: High
impact: Medium
risk_score: 12
existing_controls:
- "Generic error pages in production"
gaps:
- "Some microservices return raw exceptions"
recommended_mitigations:
- "Centralized error handling middleware"
- "Error response schema validation"
status: "Open"
owner: "Backend Team"
- id: T004
category: Denial of Service
description: "API rate limiting bypass through distributed requests"
attack_vector: "Botnet sending requests below per-IP threshold"
likelihood: Medium
impact: High
risk_score: 12
existing_controls:
- "Per-IP rate limiting at WAF"
gaps:
- "No aggregate rate limiting"
- "No bot detection"
recommended_mitigations:
- "Add aggregate rate limiting per endpoint"
- "Deploy bot detection (Cloudflare Bot Management)"
- "Implement circuit breaker pattern"
status: "Open"
owner: "Platform Team"
- id: T005
category: Elevation of Privilege
description: "IDOR allows accessing other users' data"
attack_vector: "Manipulating resource IDs in API calls"
likelihood: Medium
impact: Critical
risk_score: 15
existing_controls:
- "Authentication required"
gaps:
- "Authorization checks inconsistent across endpoints"
recommended_mitigations:
- "Enforce ownership checks on all resource access"
- "Use opaque IDs instead of sequential integers"
- "Add authorization integration tests"
status: "Open"
owner: "Backend Team"
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 462 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A fb9025084e74
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (1,084 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 3,633 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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