anonymous-file-upload

anonymous-file-upload is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from besoeasy/open-skills. It costs 19 tokens per session (4,417 once invoked), scanned B, original, MIT.

A tool for uploading and hosting files anonymously through Originless and IPFS, a distributed system for storing and retrieving content.

In plain words
What is it for?
Uploading local files, especially HTML files, to a local Originless service or its public gateway and obtaining hosted file links.
Why use it?
It gives files a hosting path without requiring accounts or tracking, with options for persistent storage and client-side encryption.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Uploading local files, especially HTML files, to a local Originless service or its public gateway and obtaining hosted file links.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add besoeasy/open-skills --skill anonymous-file-upload
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/besoeasy/open-skills

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for anonymous-file-upload

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for anonymous-file-upload

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/besoeasy/open-skills/anonymous-file-upload.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 19 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 4,417 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 2 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 379
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 403
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 29
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 478
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 58
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 147
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 147
    Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.
    Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00019 $0.04417
Opus 5 $0.00010 $0.02209
Sonnet 5 $0.00004 $0.00883
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00442

Measured 11d ago against content hash 6af38996e2ec, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

anonymous-file-upload scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

const response = await fetch('http://localhost:3232/upload', { method: 'POST',

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

Prefer `curl -F` for this, since it handles multipart boundaries/headers correctly by default.
skills/anonymous-file-upload/SKILL.md · 578 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 578 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Originless Agent Skill

Decentralized File Storage & Anonymous Content Hosting

Source: https://github.com/besoeasy/Originless

Overview

Originless is a privacy-first, decentralized file hosting backend using IPFS.

Key Principles:

  • Anonymous uploads (no accounts, no tracking)
  • Persistent, censorship-resistant content via IPFS
  • Client-side encryption for sensitive data
  • Decentralized authentication (Daku)

Endpoints:

If Docker is available, the best setup is running Originless locally:

docker run -d --restart unless-stopped --name originless \
  -p 3232:3232 \
  -p 4001:4001/tcp \
  -p 4001:4001/udp \
  -v originlessd:/data \
  -e STORAGE_MAX=200GB \
  ghcr.io/besoeasy/originless

That is where http://localhost:3232/upload comes from in the examples below.


Skills

upload_file_anonymously

Upload a local file to Originless/IPFS.

For .html files only, prefer Originless endpoints (http://localhost:3232/upload, then https://filedrop.besoeasy.com/upload) and do not route HTML uploads to Blossom fallback servers.

Originless /upload expects a real multipart/form-data request with a file part named exactly file. Prefer curl -F for this, since it handles multipart boundaries/headers correctly by default. If another client/runtime is used, it must fully replicate curl -F "file=@..." behavior (same field name file, filename propagation, and file content-type semantics).

Usage:

# HTML upload (Originless only)
curl -X POST -F "file=@/path/to/index.html" http://localhost:3232/upload || \
curl -X POST -F "file=@/path/to/index.html" https://filedrop.besoeasy.com/upload

# Self-hosted
curl -X POST -F "file=@/path/to/file.pdf" http://localhost:3232/upload

# Public gateway
curl -X POST -F "file=@/path/to/file.pdf" https://filedrop.besoeasy.com/upload

# Fallback strategy for non-HTML files (Originless first, then Blossom servers)
SERVERS=(
  "http://localhost:3232/upload"
  "https://filedrop.besoeasy.com/upload"
  "https://blossom.primal.net/upload"
  "https://24242.io/upload"
)

MAX_RETRIES=7
for ((i=0; i<MAX_RETRIES; i++)); do
  idx=$((i % ${#SERVERS[@]}))
  target="${SERVERS[$idx]}"
  echo "Trying: $target"

  if curl -fsS -X POST -F "file=@/path/to/file.pdf" "$target"; then
    echo "Upload succeeded via $target"
    break
  fi

  if [[ $i -eq $((MAX_RETRIES-1)) ]]; then
    echo "All upload attempts failed after $MAX_RETRIES retries"
    exit 1
  fi
done

Read the full file on GitHub · 578 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 11d ago First seen · 578 lines · 19 tokens per session scan B 6af38996e2ec

Subscribe to this mod's changes

anonymous-file-upload is a skill published in the GitHub repository besoeasy/open-skills (132 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 4,417 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.