Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills --skill gh-cligit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/gh-cli)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/gh-cli"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/gh-cli/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/gh-cli"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/gh-cli.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 51 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 53 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 213 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 107 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 111 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.02841 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.01136 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00568 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00284 |
Grade A, and why
gh-cli scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 264 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub gh CLI
Reliable patterns for using the GitHub gh CLI for issue, PR, and label operations — built for automation and subagent environments where silent auth failures are common and fabricating a result is the worst outcome.
When to Use: Any time you create, list, view, edit, or close GitHub issues / PRs / labels through gh, particularly inside a sandboxed shell or a delegated subagent.
The One Rule: Never Fabricate
When an operation cannot be verified as succeeded, report the failure with the exact error. Never invent an issue number, a URL, or a "created successfully" message. A loud, accurate failure is always better than a fake success — downstream agents and humans act on what gets reported.
1. Pre-flight Verification (run BEFORE any operation)
Always confirm authentication and repo access first. These are cheap, read-only, and catch the overwhelming majority of failures before you mutate anything.
# 1. Confirm you are authenticated and see which account/scopes are active
gh auth status
# 2. Confirm you can actually reach the target repo (proves token + SSO + network)
gh repo view <org>/<repo> --json name,url
- If
gh auth statusreports "not logged into any GitHub hosts" or any error, STOP. Do not run create/edit/close. Diagnose using the sections below, then report the exact error verbatim. - If
gh repo viewfails (404, SAML, Bad credentials), STOP. The token may be valid but lack access to this org/repo. Report the exact error. - Only proceed to mutating operations once both commands succeed.
In a subagent: treat a failed pre-flight as a hard stop. Returning "I created issue #42" when auth failed is the failure mode this skill exists to prevent.
2. Gotcha: Sandbox / OS keychain access
gh's OAuth (keyring) tokens are stored in the OS keychain (macOS Keychain, Linux Secret Service). A sandboxed shell cannot read the keychain, so gh falls back to "no credentials found" and reports "not logged into any GitHub hosts" — even though valid credentials exist.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 264 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A ce3602a7e076
gh-cli is a skill published in the GitHub repository bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills (78 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 2,841 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
gh-cli compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| gh-clibobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills | Skill | 78 | 3mo ago | MIT | A | 42 | Claude Code |
| githubinitializ/forge | Skill | 235 | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 15 | Claude Code, Codex |
| github-mcpFriz-zy/ai-capability-registry | Skill | 12 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code, Codex |
| c-githubdaxaur/openpaw | Skill | 177 | 5mo ago | MIT | A | 48 | Claude Code, Codex |
| code-reviewfurkangonel/cowrangler | Skill | 1 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 37 | Claude Code, Codex |
| github-workflowsdirtybits/agent-skills | Skill | 2 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 41 | Claude Code, Codex |
| github-managerchainlesschain/chainlesschain | Skill | 11 | today | none | A | 21 | Claude Code |