Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills/wordpress-security-validation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 85 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Tool Misuse · line 176 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 301 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 401 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 1285 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 747 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1228 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.11789 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.05895 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.02358 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.01179 |
Grade A, and why
wordpress-security-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,630 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
WordPress Security & Data Validation
Version: 1.1.0 Target: WordPress 6.7+ | PHP 8.3+ Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
Overview
Security is not optional in WordPress development—it's fundamental. This skill teaches the three-layer security model that prevents XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, and other common web vulnerabilities through proper input sanitization, business logic validation, and output escaping.
The Golden Rule: "Sanitize on input, validate for logic, escape on output."
Why This Matters
Every year, thousands of WordPress sites are compromised due to security vulnerabilities in plugins and themes. Most of these attacks exploit one of three weaknesses:
- XSS (Cross-Site Scripting): Malicious JavaScript injected through unsanitized output
- CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery): Unauthorized actions performed on behalf of authenticated users
- SQL Injection: Database manipulation through unsanitized database queries
This skill provides complete, production-ready patterns for preventing all three attack vectors.
The Three-Layer Security Model
WordPress security follows a defense-in-depth strategy with three distinct layers:
User Input → [1. SANITIZE] → [2. VALIDATE] → Process → [3. ESCAPE] → Output
Layer 1: Sanitization (Input Cleaning)
Purpose: Remove dangerous characters and normalize data format
When: Immediately upon receiving user input
Example: sanitize_text_field($_POST['username'])
Layer 2: Validation (Logic Checks)
Purpose: Ensure data meets business requirements
When: After sanitization, before processing
Example: if (!is_email($email)) { /* error */ }
Layer 3: Escaping (Output Protection)
Purpose: Prevent XSS by encoding special characters
When: Every time you output data to browser
Example: echo esc_html($user_input);
Critical Distinction:
- Sanitization removes/transforms invalid data (changes the value)
- Validation checks if data is acceptable (returns true/false)
- Escaping makes data safe for display (context-specific encoding)
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 1,630 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A d772ba7920f4
wordpress-security-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository bobmatnyc/claude-mpm-skills (74 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 11,789 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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