Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu --skill ubuntu-server-audit-eugit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-euWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/ubuntu-server-audit-eu)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/ubuntu-server-audit-eu"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/ubuntu-server-audit-eu"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu/ubuntu-server-audit-eu.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.01417 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00709 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00283 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00142 |
Grade A, and why
ubuntu-server-audit-eu scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 83 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Ubuntu Server Audit EU
Use this skill for strict read-only SSH inspections of Ubuntu/Linux servers before security, compliance, or server readiness review. The audit must be transparent: every area is marked checked, partial, blocked, or not checked, with reason.
Absolute Rules
- Strict read-only mode by default. Do not modify files, services, packages, firewall, containers, users, logs, databases, or application state.
- Never run destructive or state-changing commands:
rm,rmdir,unlink,mv,cpto server paths,chmod,chown,truncate,tee, redirects to files, package install/remove/upgrade,apt update,systemctl restart/start/stop/enable/disable,docker rm/prune,journalctl --vacuum-*, database writes, config edits, hardening scripts, or remediation tools. - Do not install Lynis, USG, Falco, Tetragon, AIDE, rkhunter, debsums, Goss, ssh-audit, or any other tool during the audit.
- Do not run audit tools that write logs/reports/state by default unless a no-write/no-log mode is confirmed for that exact command. If no safe no-write mode is confirmed, report tool availability only and mark execution as
blocked: would write audit output/state. - Avoid
sudounless read-only visibility requires it. Ifsudois needed, use informational commands only and note the reason. - Do not print secrets: private keys, tokens,
.envvalues, password hashes, API keys, certificate private keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, backup credentials, or vault contents. Prefer metadata: path, owner, mode, size, mtime, and redacted key names. - Treat secret-bearing paths as sensitive metadata. Even without file contents, paths can reveal customers, environments, application names, technologies, or internal architecture.
- Treat these as sensitive output surfaces:
ps aux,systemctl status,systemctl cat,docker inspect,docker exec env,journalctl,.envfiles, app config files, shell histories, backup manifests, CI/CD files, credential vaults, and remote commands such asssh host "cat /path/to/.env". - Never read secret-bearing files to stdout. For
.env, vault, keyring, private key, and credential directories, list metadata or key names only; do not print values. - If command output includes process arguments, environment variables, headers, URLs, or config lines with secrets, redact them before saving, reporting, or sharing.
- If a secret appears in process arguments or service definitions, record it as a security finding after redaction. The exposure itself matters even if the final report masks the value.
- Prefer existence/shape checks over value checks:
EXISTS/MISSING, counts, file metadata, variable names, or redactedKEY=***output. - Review and sanitize captured outputs before sharing them with users, customers, auditors, tickets, or public repositories.
- Keep a coverage ledger for every host and category.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 83 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A aa54a7caaf46
ubuntu-server-audit-eu is a skill published in the GitHub repository bugroo/ubuntu-server-audit-eu (1 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 1,417 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-aws-security-hub-compliance
Implementing AWS Security Hub to aggregate security findings across AWS accounts, enable compliance standards like CIS AWS Foundations and PCI DSS, configure automated remediation with EventBridge and Lambda, and create custom security insights for organizational risk management.
implementing-cloud-security-posture-management
Implementing Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) to continuously monitor multi-cloud environments for misconfigurations, compliance violations, and security risks using Prowler, ScoutSuite, AWS Security Hub, Azure Defender, and GCP Security Command Center.
implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints
Implement GCP Organization Policy constraints to enforce security guardrails across the entire resource hierarchy, restricting risky configurations and ensuring compliance at organization, folder, and project levels.
performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench
Audit Kubernetes cluster security posture against CIS benchmarks using kube-bench with automated checks for control plane, worker nodes, and RBAC.
implementing-aws-nitro-enclave-security
Implements AWS Nitro Enclave-based confidential computing environments with cryptographic attestation, KMS policy integration using PCR-based condition keys, and secure vsock communication channels. The practitioner builds enclave images, configures attestation-aware KMS policies, validates attestation documents…