Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraintsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.01869 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00934 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00374 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00187 |
Grade A, and why
implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 288 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implementing GCP Organization Policy Constraints
Overview
The GCP Organization Policy Service provides centralized and programmatic control over cloud resources. Organization policies configure constraints that restrict one or more Google Cloud services, enforced at organization, folder, or project levels. They improve security by blocking external IPs, requiring encryption, and minimizing unauthorized access. Changes can take up to 15 minutes to propagate.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing gcp organization policy constraints capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Common Misconfigurations & Verification
- Policy left as dry-run: a policy set with
dryRunSpec: truemonitors and logs would-be violations but never blocks them. Confirm the live (enforced) spec exists, not just the dry-run, withgcloud org-policies describe <constraint> --organization=ORG_ID --effective. - Child override silently weakens the org policy: a project/folder policy with
inheritFromParent: falseor areset/allValues: ALLOWrule negates the org guardrail. Audit effective policy at the leaf, not just the org node. - List constraint inverted or too narrow:
allowedValuesthat omits a region your workloads use causes outages;allValues: ALLOWon a deny-intended constraint makes it a no-op. Validate againstgcp.resourceLocationsvalue groups (in:us-locations). - Boolean constraint declared but
enforced: false: e.g.iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreationpresent but disabled still allows key creation. - Propagation lag: changes take up to ~15 minutes; don't conclude enforcement failed before then.
gcloud org-policies describe constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess --organization=ORG_ID --effective
gcloud org-policies list --project=PROJECT_ID # spot child overrides
gcloud asset search-all-resources --scope=organizations/ORG_ID \
--query="policy:constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess" # find violating resources
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 288 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 3324d8e29e59
implementing-gcp-organization-policy-constraints is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (972 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 1,869 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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