Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill cloud-iam-deepgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cloud-iam-deep)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cloud-iam-deep"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cloud-iam-deep/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cloud-iam-deep"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cloud-iam-deep.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 97 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 50 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 51 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 151 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 193 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 201 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 217 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.02620 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01310 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00524 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00262 |
Grade B, and why
cloud-iam-deep scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/v1/accounts:signUp?key=$API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Senha123!","returnSec Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
r = requests.get(url, timeout=5) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 272 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cloud IAM Deep -- Cloud Functions, Storage, IAM Exploitation
When to Use
- After finding Firebase API keys, Supabase keys, or GCP SA keys
- When a target uses serverless (Cloud Functions, Cloud Run)
- After finding S3 bucket names or MinIO instances
- One SA key can escalate to full cloud access
Cloud Functions URL Patterns (GCP)
https://{REGION}-{PROJECT_ID}.cloudfunctions.net/{FUNCTION_NAME}
https://us-central1-{PROJECT_ID}.cloudfunctions.net/api/feed
PROJECT_ID Discovery
projects = ["empresa", "empresa-app", "empresa-prod", "empresa-dev",
"empresa-1", "empresa-12345", "app-empresa", "admin-1a2b3"]
regions = ["us-central1", "us-east1", "southamerica-east1", "europe-west1"]
for proj in projects:
for region in regions:
url = f"https://{region}-{proj}.cloudfunctions.net/api/feed?limit=1"
try:
r = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
if r.status_code != 404 and len(r.text) > 20:
print(f"DONE {url} -> {r.status_code}")
except:
pass
Testing HTTP Methods Without Auth
methods = {
"GET": requests.get,
"POST": lambda u: requests.post(u, json={"test": "test"}),
"PUT": lambda u: requests.put(u, json={"test": "test"}),
"DELETE": lambda u: requests.delete(u),
}
for method_name, method_func in methods.items():
try:
r = method_func(url)
if r.status_code not in [401, 403, 404, 405]:
print(f"WARN {method_name} {url} -> {r.status_code} (ACCEPTED!)")
except:
pass
Real-world case (CRITICAL): 6 Cloud Functions from fitness tech platform:
- GET without auth -- dump of 15,800+ posts, 389+ users, real student data
- DELETE without auth -- confirmed destruction of production data
- Reflected CORS on ALL 6 functions -- drive-by attack possible
- 705 PDF tokens leaked
Source Code Buckets (gcf-sources-*)
gcf-sources-{PROJECT_NUMBER}-{REGION}
gcf-v2-sources-{PROJECT_NUMBER}-{REGION}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 272 lines · 35 tokens per session scan B 1584cb909a85
cloud-iam-deep is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,247 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 2,620 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
conducting-cloud-infrastructure-penetration-test
Perform a cloud infrastructure penetration test across AWS, Azure, and GCP to identify IAM misconfigurations, exposed storage buckets, insecure serverless functions, and cloud-native attack paths using Pacu, ScoutSuite, and Prowler.
conducting-cloud-infrastructure-penetration-test
Perform a cloud infrastructure penetration test across AWS, Azure, and GCP to identify IAM misconfigurations, exposed storage buckets, insecure serverless functions, and cloud-native attack paths using Pacu, ScoutSuite, and Prowler.
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
performing-aws-privilege-escalation-assessment
Performing authorized privilege escalation assessments in AWS environments to identify IAM misconfigurations that allow users or roles to elevate their permissions using Pacu, CloudFox, Principal Mapper, and manual IAM policy analysis techniques.
securing-aws-lambda-execution-roles
Securing AWS Lambda execution roles by implementing least-privilege IAM policies, applying permission boundaries, restricting resource-based policies, using IAM Access Analyzer to validate permissions, and enforcing role scoping through SCPs.
detecting-aws-iam-privilege-escalation
Detect AWS IAM privilege escalation paths using boto3 and Cloudsplaining policy analysis to identify overly permissive policies, dangerous permission combinations, and least-privilege violations.