Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/buzzer-re/rikugan/malware-analysisnpx skills add buzzer-re/Rikugan --skill malware-analysisgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/buzzer-re/RikuganWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/buzzer-re/rikugan/malware-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/buzzer-re/rikugan/malware-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/buzzer-re/rikugan/malware-analysis.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.01175 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00588 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00235 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00118 |
Grade A, and why
Malware Analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 102 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Task: Malware Analysis. You are analyzing a potentially malicious Windows PE binary. Defang all IOCs (hxxps://, [.]).
Phase 0: Obfuscation Triage
Before analysis, check for obfuscation:
- Decompile the entry point and a few key functions
- If code is heavily obfuscated (opaque predicates, CFF, MBA): invoke
/deobfuscationfirst - If very few readable strings in a large binary → strings are encrypted
- Look for the string decode stub: a small function called before every string use
- If strings are encrypted: trace the decode function, understand the algorithm (XOR, RC4, custom)
Crypto constant hunting: When you find RC4 S-box or AES constants via search_strings, use xrefs_to on the constant's address (not the S-box itself) → finds KSA/key schedule → decompile that → xrefs_to on it → finds the encrypt/decrypt wrapper. Do NOT use hex pattern search for KSA byte-swap — too many false positives.
Phase 1: Reconnaissance
Use built-in tools for initial survey:
get_binary_info— format, architecture, size, function countlist_imports— group by DLL, identify capabilities:- WINHTTP/WININET = Network communication
- CRYPT32/ADVAPI32 (Crypt*) = Cryptographic operations
- GDI32 = Screenshot capture
- ntdll = Low-level ops, possible direct syscalls
list_strings+search_strings— look for URLs, API paths, user agents, mutex names, file extensions, registry paths, app paths (Discord, Telegram, Chrome)list_exports— exported functions and ordinals
Batch these calls: get_binary_info + list_imports + list_exports can run in parallel.
Phase 2: Execution Flow
- Decompile entry point / WinMain with
decompile_function - Identify the execution sequence and lifecycle: init → config → steal → exfil → exit
- Use
function_xrefsto map the call graph from entry - Categorize functions: initialization, C2, stealing modules, exfiltration, cleanup
Phase 3: Targeted Analysis — Kill Chain
For network malware:
- Trace: socket init → DNS resolution → connect → send/recv
- Identify C2 protocol (raw socket, HTTP, DNS tunneling)
- Extract C2 config (hardcoded IP/domain or decrypted)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 102 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A a432a6d60013
Malware Analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository buzzer-re/Rikugan (672 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 1,175 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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