Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill wordpress-plugin-huntgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/wordpress-plugin-hunt)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/wordpress-plugin-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/wordpress-plugin-hunt/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/wordpress-plugin-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/wordpress-plugin-hunt.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 151 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Supply Chain · line 269 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.04050 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.01620 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00810 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00405 |
Grade B, and why
wordpress-plugin-hunt scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/gf/v2/forms" 2>/dev/null | python3 -m json.tool | head -20 Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, nmap, python3, masscan, subfinder, httpx, nuclei How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 309 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
WordPress Plugin Hunt Skill
Discover installed WordPress plugins through REST API namespace probing, readme.txt version detection, and HTML/JS source analysis. Cross-reference discovered versions against known CVEs for exploitation. WordPress plugin vulnerabilities are one of the most reliable paths to RCE — confirmed CVEs include Elementor, Slider Revolution, ElementsKit, Gravity Forms, Jetpack, WooCommerce, and LiteSpeed Cache.
When to Use
- WordPress confirmed on target (via
wp-mass-recon). - Running
deep-invadePhase 3. - You need an exploitation vector beyond CORS/XMLRPC.
- Target has a plugin-heavy WordPress site (e-commerce, page builder, forms).
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl, python3.- WordPress target confirmed (
/wp-json/or/wp-login.phpaccessible). - For CVE exploitation: knowledge of specific CVE PoCs (reference
security-arsenalskill).
How to Run
# Quick plugin namespace scan (30+ plugins)
TARGET="example.com"
for ns in "revslider/v1" "elementskit/v1" "elementor/v1" "gf/v2" "wc/v3" \
"jetpack/v4" "litespeed/v1" "yoast/v1" "acf/v3" "contact-form-7/v1" \
"solidwp-mail/v1" "wpsl/v1" "redirection/v1" "rankmath/v1"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "https://$TARGET/wp-json/$ns")
[[ "$code" != "404" ]] && echo "FOUND: /wp-json/$ns (HTTP $code)"
done
Quick Reference
Top Exploitable Plugins (US SMB targets — confirmed CVEs from mass recon)
| Plugin | Vulnerable Version | CVE | Impact | Frequency |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slider Revolution | < 6.6.20 | CVE-2024-2534 | RCE via file upload | ~10% |
| ElementsKit | < 2.9.4 | CVE-2023-6851 | SQLi | ~5% |
| ElementsKit | < 2.9.4 | CVE-2023-6853 | File Upload (unauthenticated) | ~5% |
| Gravity Forms | < 2.8.2 | CVE-2024-6115 | PHP Object Injection → Auth Bypass | ~8% |
| Jetpack | < 13.1 | CVE-2024-1782 | SSRF | 28% |
| Elementor | < 3.24.0 | CVE-2024-xxxx | Info disclosure → Auth bypass | 28% |
| LiteSpeed Cache | < 6.5.0 | CVE-2024-50550 | Privilege escalation | ~15% |
| WooCommerce | N/A (API exposure) | N/A | Order/customer data | 42% |
| Yoast SEO | N/A (sitemap enum) | N/A | Author email leak | 42% |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 309 lines · 19 tokens per session scan B c7bc95471adb
wordpress-plugin-hunt is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,314 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 4,050 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions
Systematically audit AWS S3 bucket permissions to identify publicly accessible buckets, overly permissive ACLs, misconfigured bucket policies, and missing encryption settings using AWS CLI, S3audit, and Prowler to enforce least-privilege data access controls.
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security
Auditing Terraform infrastructure-as-code for security misconfigurations using Checkov, tfsec, Terrascan, and OPA/Rego policies to detect overly permissive IAM policies, public resource exposure, missing encryption, and insecure defaults before cloud deployment.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts
Detecting data exfiltration attempts from AWS S3 buckets by analyzing CloudTrail S3 data events, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings, Amazon Macie alerts, and S3 access patterns to identify unauthorized bulk downloads and cross-account data transfers.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.