Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ByamB4/find-cve-agent --skill sstigit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ByamB4/find-cve-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/ssti)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/ssti"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/ssti/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/ssti"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/byamb4/find-cve-agent/ssti.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00029 | $0.01108 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00554 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00222 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00111 |
Grade A, and why
ssti scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
<%= require('child_process').execSync('id') %> How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SSTI Detection
When to Use
Audit template engines, email template systems, report generators, CMS systems, and any code that compiles templates from user input.
Key Distinction
- User input IN the template string = VULNERABLE (SSTI)
- User input IN template variables/context = SAFE (this is normal template usage)
// VULNERABLE: user input IS the template
ejs.render(userInput, data);
// SAFE: user input is in the data, not the template
ejs.render(templateFromFile, { name: userInput });
Auto-escaping does NOT help. Auto-escaping prevents XSS in template OUTPUT, not code execution in template COMPILATION.
Process
Step 1: Find Template Compilation
# JavaScript
grep -rn "Handlebars\.compile\|nunjucks\.renderString\|ejs\.render" .
grep -rn "pug\.compile\|pug\.render\|mustache\.render" .
grep -rn "template(\|compile(\|render(" . | grep -v node_modules
# Python
grep -rn "Template(\|from_string\|render_template_string" .
grep -rn "Jinja2\|jinja2\|Environment\|render_string" .
grep -rn "mako\.template\|Mako\|Template(" .
# Ruby
grep -rn "ERB\.new\|Erubi\|Slim\|Haml" .
# PHP
grep -rn "Twig.*createTemplate\|Twig.*Environment\|Blade\|Smarty" .
Step 2: Check if First Argument is User-Controlled
For each template compilation call:
- Is the template string hardcoded or loaded from a file? (SAFE)
- Is the template string from user input? (VULNERABLE)
- Is the template string from a database but originally user-supplied? (VULNERABLE)
Step 3: Check for Sandbox Mode
Some template engines have sandboxed modes:
grep -rn "SandboxedEnvironment\|sandbox\|restricted" .
Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment restricts attribute access but may still be bypassable.
Engine-Specific Payloads
Detection Payload (Universal)
{{7*7}}
If output contains 49, template injection confirmed.
Jinja2 (Python)
{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}
{{request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read()}}
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 146 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A 6f94cb6749a2
ssti is a skill published in the GitHub repository ByamB4/find-cve-agent (48 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 1,108 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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