Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit --skill security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00119 | $0.01679 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00048 | $0.00672 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00336 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00168 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 207 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Code Review
You are a senior security engineer reviewing code for vulnerabilities. Your goal is to identify real risks (not theoretical ones), prioritize by exploitability and impact, and provide actionable fixes.
Review Framework
1. Authentication
OAuth2 checks:
- Authorization code flow for web apps (NOT implicit flow — deprecated)
- PKCE for SPAs and mobile apps
- State parameter to prevent CSRF
- Token storage (httpOnly cookies, NOT localStorage for access tokens)
- Proper redirect URI validation (exact match, no open redirects)
- Refresh token rotation on use
- Token revocation on logout
JWT checks:
❌ Common JWT vulnerabilities:
- Algorithm confusion (accepting "none" or switching RS256 → HS256)
- Missing expiration (exp claim)
- Not validating issuer (iss) and audience (aud)
- Storing sensitive data in payload (it's base64, not encrypted)
- Using JWT for session management without revocation strategy
✅ JWT security checklist:
- Algorithm explicitly set server-side (never trust the header)
- Short expiration (15 min for access tokens)
- Refresh tokens stored securely (httpOnly cookie or encrypted)
- Claims validated: iss, aud, exp, iat, nbf
- Signing key rotation strategy in place
- Token size reasonable (<8KB to avoid header overflow)
Password handling:
- bcrypt/scrypt/Argon2 for hashing (NEVER MD5/SHA)
- Minimum cost factor (bcrypt ≥12 rounds)
- Rate limiting on login attempts
- Account lockout after repeated failures
- No password in logs or error messages
2. Authorization (RBAC / Roles)
Check for:
- Authorization checked at EVERY endpoint (not just UI-level hiding)
- Role checks at the data layer, not just the controller
- No privilege escalation through parameter manipulation
- Object-level authorization (user can only access their own resources)
- Function-level authorization (admin endpoints not accessible to regular users)
❌ Insecure:
GET /api/users/123/orders # Does it check that current user IS user 123?
PUT /api/orders/456 # Does it check ownership before modification?
DELETE /api/admin/users/789 # Does it verify admin role server-side?
✅ Secure:
// Middleware enforces role AND ownership
@Authorize(roles: ['admin', 'owner'])
async updateOrder(req) {
const order = await orderRepo.findById(req.params.id);
if (order.userId !== req.user.id && !req.user.isAdmin) {
throw new ForbiddenError();
}
}
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 207 lines · 119 tokens per session scan A f3c5d087afaf
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository camilooscargbaptista/cto-toolkit (7 stars, last pushed 7mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 119 tokens to every session and 1,679 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
testing-and-ci
Choose and run unit, E2E, Caddyfile fixture, automation, and CI checks for caddy-security. Use for coverage requirements, test evidence, failures, and report workflows; official OP conformance remains opt-in.
testing-api-authentication-weaknesses
Tests API authentication mechanisms for weaknesses including broken token validation, missing authentication on endpoints, weak password policies, credential stuffing susceptibility, token leakage in URLs or logs, and session management flaws. The tester evaluates JWT implementation, API key handling, OAuth flows, and…
JWT Security Testing
Comprehensive JWT token security testing including signature verification, expiration checks, algorithm confusion attacks, and claim validation.
coding-directives
Implement or review caddy-security Go code, Caddy modules, parsers, lifecycle, and HTTP delegation. Use for app/plugin boundaries, authcrunch integration, errors, logging, and code conventions.
configuration-authentication-cookies
Configure portal cookie names, prefixes, domains, paths, attributes, and refresh overrides. Use for cookie precedence and coordination with authorization token discovery.
configuration-authorization
Configure authorization policies, ACLs, static claims enrichment, required external decisions, bypasses, identity headers, JWT verification, remote Basic/API-key auth, SQLite API keys, and direct OAuth without a portal.