Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ccashwell/evm-cortexnpx agentmods add skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patternsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ccashwell/evm-cortex/subgraph-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 257 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.02042 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00817 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00408 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00204 |
Grade A, and why
subgraph-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 296 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
The Graph Subgraph Patterns
Project Structure
my-subgraph/
├── subgraph.yaml # Manifest: data sources, event handlers
├── schema.graphql # Entity definitions (GraphQL)
├── src/
│ └── mappings.ts # Event handler logic (AssemblyScript)
├── tests/
│ └── mappings.test.ts # Matchstick unit tests
├── abis/
│ └── MyContract.json # Contract ABIs
└── networks.json # Multi-network config
Subgraph Manifest (subgraph.yaml)
specVersion: 1.0.0
indexerHints:
prune: auto
schema:
file: ./schema.graphql
dataSources:
- kind: ethereum
name: MyProtocol
network: base
source:
address: "0xContractAddress"
abi: MyProtocol
startBlock: 12345678 # Block contract was deployed
mapping:
kind: ethereum/events
apiVersion: 0.0.9
language: wasm/assemblyscript
entities:
- Deposit
- Withdrawal
- User
abis:
- name: MyProtocol
file: ./abis/MyProtocol.json
- name: ERC20
file: ./abis/ERC20.json
eventHandlers:
- event: Deposit(indexed address,uint256,uint256)
handler: handleDeposit
- event: Withdrawal(indexed address,uint256)
handler: handleWithdrawal
file: ./src/mappings.ts
templates:
- kind: ethereum
name: Vault
network: base
source:
abi: Vault
mapping:
kind: ethereum/events
apiVersion: 0.0.9
language: wasm/assemblyscript
entities:
- VaultDeposit
abis:
- name: Vault
file: ./abis/Vault.json
eventHandlers:
- event: VaultDeposit(indexed address,uint256)
handler: handleVaultDeposit
file: ./src/vault-mappings.ts
Schema Design (schema.graphql)
type Protocol @entity {
id: Bytes! # Use Bytes! for addresses
totalDeposited: BigDecimal!
totalUsers: BigInt!
vaults: [Vault!]! @derivedFrom(field: "protocol")
}
type User @entity {
id: Bytes! # user address
deposits: [Deposit!]! @derivedFrom(field: "user")
totalDeposited: BigDecimal!
firstDepositAt: BigInt!
lastActiveAt: BigInt!
}
type Vault @entity {
id: Bytes! # vault address
protocol: Protocol!
asset: Bytes!
totalAssets: BigDecimal!
deposits: [Deposit!]! @derivedFrom(field: "vault")
createdAt: BigInt!
createdAtBlock: BigInt!
}
type Deposit @entity(immutable: true) {
id: Bytes! # tx hash + log index
user: User!
vault: Vault!
amount: BigDecimal!
shares: BigInt!
timestamp: BigInt!
blockNumber: BigInt!
transactionHash: Bytes!
}
type DailySnapshot @entity {
id: String! # "YYYY-MM-DD"
date: BigInt!
totalDeposited: BigDecimal!
depositCount: BigInt!
uniqueUsers: BigInt!
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 296 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 4ac243bfa39b
subgraph-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository ccashwell/evm-cortex (132 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 2,042 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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