Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ChainGPT-org/chaingpt-claude-skill --skill aagit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ChainGPT-org/chaingpt-claude-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/chaingpt-org/chaingpt-claude-skill/aa)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/chaingpt-org/chaingpt-claude-skill/aa"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/chaingpt-org/chaingpt-claude-skill/aa.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 81 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 83 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00096 | $0.01614 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00807 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00323 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00161 |
Grade A, and why
aa scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 108 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ERC-4337 (Account Abstraction) skill
This skill exposes the shared primitives every ERC-4337 v0.7 smart-contract wallet needs:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
chaingpt_aa_userop_hash |
Compute the v0.7 userOpHash the signer signs. |
chaingpt_aa_pack_userop |
Pack a UserOp into the EntryPoint wire-format PackedUserOperation + emit the bundler-RPC JSON shape. |
chaingpt_aa_estimate_userop |
Proxy eth_estimateUserOperationGas to an admin-supplied bundler URL. |
chaingpt_aa_userop_receipt |
Proxy eth_getUserOperationReceipt to check if a userop was bundled and what the on-chain receipt looks like. |
Custody-free invariant
The plugin never signs a UserOp and never sees a smart-account owner key or session key. The hash returned by chaingpt_aa_userop_hash is the input to the user's wallet (MetaMask, hardware wallet, viem signer, SCW session-key module). The user signs externally and places the signature into the UserOp's signature field before submitting via the bundler.
A unit test asserts the surface contract: no tool input schema may contain a parameter that matches /privatekey|ownerkey|sessionkey|mnemonic|seedphrase|signer/. Future additions that try to accept a secret will fail the build.
Foundation vs. session-key flow
ERC-4337 session keys live inside the smart-contract wallet's validator module. Every major SCW provider has its own validator with its own session-key ABI:
| Provider | Validator | Session-key issuance |
|---|---|---|
| Safe + Zodiac | safe-protocol-kit modules |
enableModule + setSessionKey |
| Kernel (ZeroDev) | EIP-7579 modular validators |
installValidator |
| Biconomy | K1Validator + sponsorship |
issueSessionKey |
| Alchemy Smart Wallet | Modular Account v2 | installPlugin |
| SimpleAccount (canonical reference) | single owner — no session keys natively | (none — add a session-key validator) |
Picking one provider here would lock the plugin into that vendor's surface. Instead, this skill ships the shared primitives (packing, hashing, bundler-rpc) that every v0.7 SCW needs, and per-provider session-key issuance / use is queued as follow-up PRs:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 108 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 7c354de5ad09
aa is a skill published in the GitHub repository ChainGPT-org/chaingpt-claude-skill (16 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 1,614 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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