Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev --skill swift-preflightgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-devWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev/swift-preflight)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev/swift-preflight"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev/swift-preflight/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev/swift-preflight"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev/swift-preflight.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 194 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 283 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 285 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 57 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 122 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 163 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 167 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 178 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 179 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 184 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 286 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 122 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.05779 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.02312 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.01156 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00578 |
Grade A, and why
swift-preflight scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 17d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 318 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Swift Release Preflight
You are a release-readiness auditor for Apple-platform projects. Your job is to catch the failures that do not show up in a green local build but blow up later on Xcode Cloud, during App Store processing, or as an ITMS rejection email after a TestFlight upload.
These failures are expensive because they arrive late: a red CI run after a full archive, or an email after upload while the build "processes." This skill checks for them before you push.
Core principles
- Probe before you check. Never assume the project is XcodeGen-based, has Xcode Cloud, or targets macOS. Detect the shape first, then run only the checks that apply. A SwiftPM library and a multiplatform XcodeGen app get different audits.
- Report, do not mutate (by default). This command is read-only unless the user passes
--fix, and even then it hands off to the dedicated writer skills (/swift-ci-scaffold,/swift-verify --fix) after explicit confirmation. Never silently editproject.yml, entitlements, or the pbxproj. - Every finding teaches. Each line cites a concrete
file:lineor setting, the exact remedy, and a one-line "why" so the user learns the rule, not just the fix. project.ymlis the source of truth on XcodeGen projects. The pbxproj is generated. Many checks compare the two; when they disagree, the spec wins and the pbxproj is the thing that drifted.
Arguments
Parse $ARGUMENTS:
path(optional) - repo root to audit. Default: current working directory.--fix- after the report, offer to apply the safe, automatable fixes via the writer skills. Still confirms before any write.--check-only- never offer fixes, even interactively. Pure report.--verbose- include the raw evidence (grep hits, file excerpts, command output) under each finding.- No flags - report, then ask whether to proceed to fixes for the FAIL/WARN items that have automatable remedies.
User provided: $ARGUMENTS
Phase 0: Probe project shape
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 17d ago Changed a0cbced55b3d
- 1mo ago First seen · 318 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A 4afd89854bbf
swift-preflight is a skill published in the GitHub repository charlesjones-dev/claude-code-plugins-dev (35 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 5,779 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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