Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add coddy-project/coddy-agent --skill configure-coddygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/coddy-project/coddy-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/coddy-project/coddy-agent/configure-coddy)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/coddy-project/coddy-agent/configure-coddy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/coddy-project/coddy-agent/configure-coddy/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/coddy-project/coddy-agent/configure-coddy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/coddy-project/coddy-agent/configure-coddy.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 39 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 49 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 49 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 59 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 60 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 94 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00120 | $0.08601 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00048 | $0.03440 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.01720 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00860 |
Grade A, and why
configure-coddy scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 126 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Configure Coddy
Use this skill when the user asks Coddy to configure itself. That includes explicit requests ("change the model", "set max turns to 40", "turn off auto discovery") and implied ones ("install a browser MCP", "add the pdf skill", "undo yesterday's config change"). Do not start configuring when the user has not asked for it.
Staged editing lifecycle
Configuration edits never apply immediately. The flow is always:
- Inspect with
config_geton the narrowest relevant path. Do not reconstruct unrelated config. - Stage edits with
config_set. Nothing on disk changes; commands accumulate for this session. - Review with
config_changesand summarize the pending commands to the user in plain language. - Ask the user to save. In any language, e.g. "I staged these changes: ... Save them?". Wait for a clear agreement ("да, сохраняй", "yes, save it", "go ahead").
- Commit with
config_commitonly after that agreement. The commit validates the batch, snapshots the previous file, writes atomically, and hot-reloads the running session - new skills, rules and tools become usable in the same turn, no restart needed. MCP servers are not part of config.yaml (see MCP servers below). - If the user declines or changes their mind, drop the staged commands with
config_revert(optionally scoped to one path).
config_commit also goes through Coddy's permission gate: it prompts even in accept_edits mode (a config commit can start MCP processes through mcp.project_trust and change the permission policy itself), and the dialog lists the staged commands with secrets redacted. Never weaken the permission policy merely to avoid that prompt, and never call config_commit before the user agreed to save.
Command syntax (uci-like)
config_set takes an array of commands shaped like OpenWrt's uci CLI:
| Command | Effect |
|---|---|
set agent.max_turns=40 |
Set a scalar field |
set logger.level=debug |
String fields take the literal text |
add_list logger.levels={"component":"gateway.telegram","level":"debug"} |
Raise one subsystem without turning the whole process to debug |
set providers[name=openrouter]={"type":"openai","api_base":"https://openrouter.ai/api/v1"} |
Set (or append) a named sequence entry; value is JSON |
add_list skills.dirs=/home/dev/.agents/skills |
Append to a list |
del_list skills.dirs=/home/dev/.agents/skills |
Remove a matching list entry |
delete providers[name=openrouter] |
Delete a field or entry |
delete models[model=valera/qwen3.8-27b].reasoning_levels |
Drop an optional key so its default applies again (here: reasoning levels go back to auto-detection) |
set models[model=valera/qwen3.8-27b].allow_reasoning_off=true |
Expose Off only after verifying this provider/model deployment honours Coddy's disable-reasoning request |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed 9f2d6dda07f6
- 3d ago Changed 187ed00a53f0
- 5d ago Changed fd280a322b01
- 8d ago Changed · +1 lines 2d6ed1487fac
- 10d ago Changed · +1 lines 71bb24531d93
- 11d ago Changed 34577aed848a
- 13d ago Changed · +2 lines 5e10be8df1b3
- 15d ago Changed · +1 lines c1cd1c07c098
- 16d ago Changed 8ec80decf200
- 17d ago First seen · 121 lines · 120 tokens per session scan A 5df0708d4368
configure-coddy is a skill published in the GitHub repository coddy-project/coddy-agent (183 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 120 tokens to every session and 8,601 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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