memstack-deployment-docker-setup

memstack-deployment-docker-setup is a skill for Claude Code from cwinvestments/memstack. It costs 62 tokens per session (4,173 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A setup guide for packaging an application in Docker, a system that runs software in isolated containers. It creates or plans Dockerfiles and Docker Compose configurations for local or production use, with health checks and managed volumes.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to containerize Node.js, Python, Go, Rust, or static projects and configure related services such as databases, caches, or message queues.
Why use it?
It helps make the application's runtime and supporting services more consistent across developers and deployment environments.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Needs its repository: it runs a file that does not travel with it, so clone the repository first. The line is COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/.next/static ./.next/static.

Part of the memstack plugin — 87 skills, 2 commands, 6 hooks shipped together

Good fit Use it to containerize Node.js, Python, Go, Rust, or static projects and configure related services such as databases, caches, or message queues.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cwinvestments/memstack
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/cwinvestments/memstack/docker-setup

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install memstack, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 87 skills, 2 commands, 6 hooks.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for memstack-deployment-docker-setup

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cwinvestments/memstack/docker-setup/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cwinvestments/memstack/docker-setup)
Your own site
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for memstack-deployment-docker-setup

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cwinvestments/memstack/docker-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cwinvestments/memstack/docker-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 62 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 4,173 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high Privilege Escalation · line 179
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 180
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 296
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 313
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 503
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 516
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 102
    Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.
    Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 235
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 341
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 351
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • medium MCP Rug Pull · line 359
    Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
    Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
  • low Tool Misuse · line 503
    Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
    Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00062 $0.04173
Opus 5.5 $0.00025 $0.01669
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00012 $0.00835
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00417

Measured 1mo ago against content hash c8693530f32f, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

memstack-deployment-docker-setup scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1
skills/deployment/docker-setup/SKILL.md · 596 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 596 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

🐳 Docker Setup: Container Configuration Generator

Analyze a project and generate optimized Dockerfiles, docker-compose configs, and deployment-ready container setups with health checks and volume management.

Activation

When this skill activates, output:

🐳 Docker Setup: Containerizing your project...

Context Status
User says "Docker", "Dockerfile", "docker-compose" ACTIVE
User wants to containerize their application ACTIVE
User mentions multi-stage builds, Docker optimization, or .dockerignore ACTIVE
User wants CI/CD with Docker (pipeline focus) DORMANT: see ci-cd-pipeline
User wants server provisioning with Docker installed DORMANT: see hetzner-setup
User wants Kubernetes orchestration DORMANT: beyond current scope

Protocol

Step 1: Gather Inputs

Ask the user for:

  • Project type: Node.js, Python, Go, Rust, static site?
  • Purpose: Local development, production deployment, or both?
  • Services needed: Database (PostgreSQL, MySQL), cache (Redis), queue (RabbitMQ)?
  • Build artifacts: Does the project compile to a binary or run interpreted?
  • Environment: Where will containers run? (local, VPS, cloud container service)

Step 2: Analyze Project & Generate Dockerfile

Detect project type from files and generate an optimized multi-stage Dockerfile:

Node.js (multi-stage):

# Stage 1: Install dependencies
FROM node:20-alpine AS deps
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts

# Stage 2: Build
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
RUN npm run build

# Stage 3: Production
FROM node:20-alpine AS runner
WORKDIR /app
ENV NODE_ENV=production

# Security: run as non-root
RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 appgroup && \
    adduser --system --uid 1001 appuser

COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/package.json ./

USER appuser
EXPOSE 3000

HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
  CMD wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1

CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]

Read the full file on GitHub · 596 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago Changed c8693530f32f
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 596 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 87c961b411ca

Subscribe to this mod's changes

memstack-deployment-docker-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository cwinvestments/memstack (425 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 4,173 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.