Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server --skill orchestrationsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-serverWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server/orchestrations)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server/orchestrations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server/orchestrations/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server/orchestrations"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server/orchestrations.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 23 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 55 Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
- high Prompt Injection · line 55 This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
- high Tool Misuse · line 55 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 31 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00159 | $0.05638 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00079 | $0.02819 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00032 | $0.01128 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00564 |
Grade A, and why
orchestrations scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
8 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- orchestrations — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 239 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to Use
Multi-phase work that chains several foundational skills against one or more MCP server projects. Typical triggers:
- "Build N new servers" / "scaffold and ship X, Y, Z" →
workflows/greenfield-build.md - "Update and release these servers" / "run maintenance and ship" →
workflows/maintenance-release.md - "QA / field-test / find-and-fix bugs in these servers" →
workflows/field-test-fix.md - "Fix these issues and ship" / handoff document with findings to act on →
workflows/fix-wrapup-release.md
Single-skill work — running just maintenance, just git-wrapup, just release-and-publish — invokes the foundational skill directly. Use this orchestrations skill when at least two phases need to chain.
Mental Model — Three Tiers
| Tier | Layer | Examples | Who reads it |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Foundational task skills | git-wrapup, release-and-publish, maintenance, field-test, setup, design-mcp-server, polish-docs-meta, code-simplifier, add-tool, add-resource, add-service, add-test, etc. |
Orchestrator AND sub-agents (by direct path reference) |
| 2 | Orchestration workflows | The four files under workflows/ |
Orchestrator only |
| 3 | Router | This SKILL.md |
Orchestrator only |
Workflows in Tier 2 sequence Tier 1 skills with gates and verification. They never duplicate Tier 1 content — they direct to it. A workflow file says "Phase N: agent reads and runs skills/git-wrapup/SKILL.md," not "here's how to wrap up a release."
The orchestrator is the agent driving the workflow — the one reading this SKILL.md. Sub-agents the orchestrator spawns receive prompts pointing at Tier 1 skills directly; they do not receive this skill or the workflow file. That boundary prevents recursive sub-agent spawning.
Pick a Workflow
Identify the workflow from user intent first, then sanity-check against project state if intent is ambiguous.
| User intent / state signal | Workflow |
|---|---|
New scaffold(s) from bunx @cyanheads/mcp-ts-core init, no implementation yet (echo definitions still present, no released changelog) |
workflows/greenfield-build.md |
Existing server(s), bun outdated shows updates, want to land them and ship |
workflows/maintenance-release.md |
| Existing server(s), want to find bugs via live testing and fix them, optionally ship | workflows/field-test-fix.md |
| Existing server(s) with known issues (GH issues, handoff document, observed gap), want to fix and ship | workflows/fix-wrapup-release.md |
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +11 lines afbde0ea6131
- 10d ago First seen · 228 lines · 159 tokens per session scan A b6a53442b543
orchestrations is a skill published in the GitHub repository cyanheads/obsidian-mcp-server (676 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 159 tokens to every session and 5,638 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
knowledge-base-management
A lifecycle system for managing an Obsidian knowledge base, which is a folder of linked notes. It organizes raw material, AI-maintained wiki pages, and generated views into separate layers.
pkm-write
Use when writing to the vault — creating new notes (vaultwrite), editing existing notes (vaultedit, vaultappend, vaultupdatefrontmatter). Handles duplicate checking, link discovery, annotations, and index updates for new notes. Provides guidelines for modifications.
pkm-session-end
Use when wrapping up a work session — creates devlog entry, captures undocumented decisions/research/debugging, audits link health of session work, and updates project index. Primarily used via the pkm-capture agent.
pkm-explore
Use when researching what the vault knows about a topic — performs graph + semantic exploration with gap analysis to map existing knowledge and find missing connections. Primarily used via the vault-explorer agent. Not for routine session-start context loading (hooks handle that).
tackle-task
Use when starting work on a specific vault task, when a task title or path is mentioned, or when coming from triage output.
triage-tasks
Use when you want to review and batch-update open vault task statuses for the current project or across all projects.