CyberStrike is an open-source AI security harness that automates penetration testing by using language models as agents for reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and reporting. Security practitioners use it to test systems from a terminal, and the catalogue contains skills and settings for its workflow.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill cis-aws-compute-5.7git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrikeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyberstrikeus/cyberstrike/cis-aws-compute-5.7)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyberstrikeus/cyberstrike/cis-aws-compute-5.7"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyberstrikeus/cyberstrike/cis-aws-compute-5.7/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyberstrikeus/cyberstrike/cis-aws-compute-5.7"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyberstrikeus/cyberstrike/cis-aws-compute-5.7.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 136 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 136 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 138 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.01259 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00629 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00252 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00126 |
Grade A, and why
cis-aws-compute-5.7 scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
The source is not reproduced here
Licensed AGPL-3.0
The repository is licensed AGPL-3.0, which this catalogue does not treat as permission to reproduce the file. Read it at the source.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 144 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 9b0895153fc0
cis-aws-compute-5.7 is a skill published in the GitHub repository CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike (2,699 stars, last pushed today), licensed AGPL-3.0. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 1,259 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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