Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add cyrusagents/cyrus --skill cyrus-setup-githubgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cyrusagents/cyrusWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyrusagents/cyrus/cyrus-setup-github)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyrusagents/cyrus/cyrus-setup-github"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyrusagents/cyrus/cyrus-setup-github/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cyrusagents/cyrus/cyrus-setup-github"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cyrusagents/cyrus/cyrus-setup-github.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 21 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 94 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 95 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 96 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 107 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 261 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 264 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 267 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 274 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 280 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 281 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 282 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 301 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 302 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 324 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 330 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 251 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 10 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 254 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 271 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 317 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.03301 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.01320 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00660 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00330 |
Grade B, and why
cyrus-setup-github scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
chmod 600 ~/.cyrus/github-app.pem Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
INSTALLATIONS=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_APP_JWT" -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" https://api.github.com/app/installations) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 349 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CRITICAL: Never use Read, Edit, or Write tools on ~/.cyrus/.env or any file inside ~/.cyrus/. Use only Bash commands (grep, printf >>, etc.) to interact with env files — secrets must never be read into the conversation context.
Setup GitHub
Configures GitHub CLI and git so Cyrus can create branches, commits, and pull requests. Optionally creates a GitHub App so Cyrus can receive and respond to @mentions in PR comments and reviews, automate rebases and merges, and auto-fix based on CI failures (coming soon).
Part A: GitHub CLI + Git Config (Outbound)
Step 1: Check Existing Configuration
Check if gh is already authenticated:
gh auth status 2>&1
If authenticated, check git config:
git config --global user.name
git config --global user.email
If both gh auth and git config are set, inform the user:
GitHub is already configured. Skipping to webhook setup.
Skip to Part B.
Step 2: Authenticate GitHub CLI
If gh is not authenticated:
gh auth login
This opens an interactive browser flow. Let the user complete it.
After completion, verify:
gh auth status
Step 3: Configure Git Identity
If git user name or email are not set, ask the user for their preferred values:
What name should appear on commits made by Cyrus? (e.g., your name, or "Cyrus Bot")
What email should appear on commits? (e.g., your email, or a noreply address)
Then set them:
git config --global user.name "<name>"
git config --global user.email "<email>"
Step 4: Verify
gh auth status
git config --global user.name
git config --global user.email
Part B: GitHub App + Webhooks (Inbound — Optional)
Ask the user:
Do you want Cyrus to respond to GitHub @mentions in PR comments and reviews?
- Yes — enable @mentions: Creates a GitHub App so Cyrus can receive PR comments and reviews via webhooks, respond when @mentioned, and act on "changes requested" reviews.
- No — PRs only: Cyrus will create branches, commits, and PRs but won't respond to comments.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 349 lines · 54 tokens per session scan B 1bbd71041c6c
cyrus-setup-github is a skill published in the GitHub repository cyrusagents/cyrus (856 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 3,301 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
baby-sit
Monitor a GitHub pull request until CI is green, diagnose failures, and rerun only evidence-backed flaky GitHub Actions jobs.
code-merge
Must be invoked when the user asks to resolve merge conflicts, merge a branch, handle an MR/PR conflict, or any similar request.
code-commit
Must be invoked when the user asks to commit code, submit code, or any similar request.
open-code-review
Performs AI-powered code review on Git changes using the ocr CLI from alibaba/open-code-review. Use when the user asks to review code, review a pull request, review staged/unstaged changes, review a commit, or compare branches for code quality issues. Produces line-level review comments and can automatically apply…
datalad
Retrieves, versions, and publishes scientific datasets with DataLad and git-annex, and captures computational provenance with datalad run, rerun, and containers-run. Use when cloning or fetching data from OpenNeuro, DANDI, datasets.datalad.org, or any DataLad dataset; when a file in a dataset reads as a broken symlink…
commit-history
List recent git commits linked to agent sessions, optionally filtered by branch or repo. Use when the user asks "show agent commits", "what has the agent shipped", "list linked commits", or wants commits with their session context.