Claude Code Skills Marketplace is a collection and marketplace of skills, plugins, agents, and instructions that extend Claude Code with specialized development workflows. It is for developers who want to install existing workflows or create, validate, and package their own Claude Code skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add daymade/claude-code-skills --skill auto-repo-setupgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/daymade/claude-code-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/daymade/claude-code-skills/auto-repo-setup)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/daymade/claude-code-skills/auto-repo-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/daymade/claude-code-skills/auto-repo-setup/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/daymade/claude-code-skills/auto-repo-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/daymade/claude-code-skills/auto-repo-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 45 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 107 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.02882 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01153 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00576 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00288 |
Grade A, and why
auto-repo-setup scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 281 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auto Repo Setup
Make the repository usable without changing the user's normal way of working. Treat setup as an evidence-driven repository task, not as a special interface for people with a particular job title.
Entry router
Classify the request before changing anything. Do not combine modes merely because they all contain the word "setup".
| User outcome | Mode | First action |
|---|---|---|
| "It won't run", missing dependency, new machine | Environment repair | Read project instructions and detect the actual stack |
| "Sync before we work", "pull the latest", or a status question during repository maintenance | Session routine | Determine sync authority from the ongoing task and project instructions, then use Workflow B |
| Repeated or unexpected hook output | Hook diagnosis | Count registrations and firing sessions before editing configuration |
| A teammate needs a repeatable handoff | Repository handoff | Audit existing onboarding and fill only the missing operational contract |
| Commit, push, conflict, leaked secret/history | Git safety | Read references/git_safety.md before mutation |
| Behavior must happen before the first prompt | Startup automation | Read references/startup_automation.md and pass its hook gate |
Operating principles
- Do not infer competence from role. Match the user's demonstrated altitude. A collaborator can tell an agent "sync the remote first"; do not invent a launcher, shortcut, or wizard unless the user asked for one.
- Use the least mechanism that satisfies the outcome. Prefer, in order: direct Agent instruction → project instruction → explicit command → lifecycle hook. A hook is not a more professional version of a sentence.
- Inspect authority before producing. Read the current user request, then project instructions, onboarding/runbooks, manifests, lockfiles, and actual command output. Do not make ONBOARDING.md, Python, uv, ffmpeg, or .env mandatory for repositories that do not declare them.
- Preserve user work. Never auto-stash, merge, rebase, force, discard, or overwrite local changes to make setup look successful. Already-authorized delivery of this task's isolated changes may use the repository's declared scoped workflow under Authorized shared-checkout delivery; this does not authorize integrating unrelated local commits or shared WIP.
- Define a falsifiable success state. "Dependencies installed" is not enough; run the project's real smoke test or startup command and verify the observable result.
- Keep diagnosis read-only until the cause is known. Installation, config edits, hook registration, commits, and external writes require the authority implied by the user's request; destructive or public actions require explicit approval.
What ships with it
10 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- evals/evals.json 2.7 KB
- references/codex-hook-trust.md 4.3 KB
- references/git_safety.md 12 KB
- references/onboarding_template.md 3.0 KB
- references/pii_guard.md 2.1 KB
- references/startup_automation.md 7.8 KB
- scripts/check_env.py 9.6 KB runs code
- scripts/init_session_start_hook.py 10 KB runs code
- scripts/sanitize_history.sh 3.9 KB runs code
- tests/test_scripts.py 9.6 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed · +4 lines 180618a0e140
- 7d ago Changed · +1 lines 4a42be254cf0
- 8d ago Changed · +12 lines c86e0388406a
- 13d ago Changed · +17 lines 4b205a324017
- 28d ago Changed · +14 lines dafef525f244
- 1mo ago Changed · -3 lines · -17 tokens per session c03dc0db84b4
- 2mo ago First seen · 236 lines · 112 tokens per session scan A 00a4c58d1d8d
auto-repo-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository daymade/claude-code-skills (1,516 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 2,882 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
auto-repo-setup compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| auto-repo-setupdaymade/claude-code-skills | Skill | 1.5k | yesterday | MIT | A | 95 | Claude Code |
| git-advanced-workflowswshobson/agents | Skill | 42k | yesterday | MIT | A | 54 | Claude Code |
| agent-merge-conflict-arbiterNousResearch/hermes-agent | Skill | 261k | yesterday | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code, Codex |
| enable-check-includes-strictchromium/chromium | Skill | 25k | yesterday | BSD-3-Clause | A | 70 | Claude Code, Codex |
| resolve-handoffomnigent-ai/omnigent | Skill | 11k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 23 | Claude Code, Codex |
| reproduce-and-fix-issuesbacknotprop/pstack | Skill | 3.7k | yesterday | MIT | A | 48 | Claude Code, Cursor |
| cy-orquestrate-issuecompozy/compozy | Skill | 2.8k | yesterday | MIT | A | 94 | Claude Code, Codex |