Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to desplega-ai/agent-swarm. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/main/.claude/internal-skills/swarm-local-e2e/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/desplega-ai/agent-swarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/swarm-local-e2e)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/swarm-local-e2e"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/swarm-local-e2e/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/swarm-local-e2e"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/desplega-ai/agent-swarm/swarm-local-e2e.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 37 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 192 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 77 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 97 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 117 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 130 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 142 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 163 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 170 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 178 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 179 Code issues a request to a loopback, link-local, or private-range host. This can reach internal services not meant to be exposed and is a common SSRF pivot.Fix: Avoid requests to loopback/link-local/private hosts from skill code. If internal access is intended, document it and validate the target against an allowlist.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 130 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 142 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.02717 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01358 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00543 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00272 |
Grade B, and why
swarm-local-e2e scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
const t = await (await fetch('http://localhost:$PORT/api/tasks', { method: 'POST', headers, Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
Use `context-mode execute` (not curl directly due to hook restrictions): How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 280 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Local E2E Testing Guide
Run full end-to-end tests of the agent swarm locally with a real API server and Docker containers.
When to Use This Skill
This skill should be invoked in two modes:
-
User-requested QA: The user asks you to run E2E tests, verify a feature, or QA a specific flow. Follow the steps below targeting what they asked for.
-
Automated change verification: After implementing changes that touch the API, runner, polling, task lifecycle, session logs, Docker entrypoint, or worker/lead behavior — use this skill proactively to verify the changes work end-to-end. Determine what's testable based on the diff:
- Task lifecycle changes (poll, runner, store-progress): Create assigned + pool tasks, verify they complete and have correct logs
- Session log changes: Run two sequential tasks on the same agent, verify log isolation (unique sessionIds, no cross-contamination)
- Docker / entrypoint changes: Build image, start containers, verify boot logs and registration
- UI changes: Start the dashboard, use agent-browser to verify rendering
- API endpoint changes: Call the endpoint directly and verify the response
You do not need to run every step — pick the subset relevant to the changes being tested.
Prerequisites
- OrbStack or Docker Desktop running (
open -a OrbStackif needed) .envwithAPI_KEYandPORTconfigured.env.docker-leadwith lead config (AGENT_ID,CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN,MCP_BASE_URL).env.dockerwith worker config (AGENT_ID,CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENorOPENROUTER_API_KEY,MCP_BASE_URL)
Step 1: Determine Your Port
Check .env for the configured port — do not assume 3013:
grep ^PORT= .env
Use this value as $PORT throughout. In worktrees, each worktree may have a different port. Always verify and use the value from .env.
Also verify the Docker env files match:
grep MCP_BASE_URL .env.docker-lead .env.docker
# Both should point to http://host.docker.internal:$PORT
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed b9c99459263d
- 5d ago Changed · -1 lines 98c4c9d088d8
- 11d ago First seen · 281 lines · 36 tokens per session scan B 4fb101c9a2c7
swarm-local-e2e is a skill published in the GitHub repository desplega-ai/agent-swarm (758 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 2,717 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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