Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/devinder1/supply-chain-scanner-public/whynpx skills add DevInder1/supply-chain-scanner-public --skill whygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/DevInder1/supply-chain-scanner-publicWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/devinder1/supply-chain-scanner-public/why)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/devinder1/supply-chain-scanner-public/why"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/devinder1/supply-chain-scanner-public/why.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.00546 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00273 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00109 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
why scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Why is this package vulnerable
When the user asks about a single specific package — "why is [email protected] flagged?", "where does brace-expansion come from?", "is requests actually exploitable?":
- Call the tridentchain MCP tool
scan_projectwith the workspace path (or use the most recent.tridentchain-out/scan-report.jsonif available). - From
raw_summary.affected_components, find the entry matching the package name and version. - Report in this order:
- Package + version + ecosystem (e.g.,
[email protected](npm)) - Is it a direct or transitive dependency? Walk the lockfile path (look in
raw_summary.scan_coverage.by_sourcefor the manifest, then read the lockfile to identify the parent that pulled it in). Show the dep chain:your-app → [email protected] → [email protected]. - CVE IDs affecting this exact version — list every CVE/GHSA ID.
- EPSS exploit-probability score (0–1; higher = more likely actively exploited). Anything above 0.1 deserves attention; above 0.5 is urgent.
- CISA KEV status — if listed, flag URGENT.
- Fix version — the lowest version that resolves all listed CVEs.
- Recommended command — the exact shell command to upgrade (e.g.,
cd <project> && npm install minimatch@latest).
- Package + version + ecosystem (e.g.,
- End with one sentence: should the user fix it now, or is it low-priority?
CLI fallback
tridentchain-security --scan project --project-path . --output-dir .tridentchain-out
# Then jq into the report:
jq '.affected_components[] | select(.name == "lodash")' .tridentchain-out/scan-report.json
Don't
- Don't auto-apply the fix command. Read it to the user; let them decide.
- Don't recommend
npm audit fix --forcewithout explicit user consent — it can introduce breaking changes.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 33 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A 31f3996ec5c3
why is a skill published in the GitHub repository DevInder1/supply-chain-scanner-public (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 546 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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